The opinion of the court was delivered by: Elizabeth M. Timothy United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and memorandum in support thereof (docs. 12, 13). Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 24). Petitioner filed a reply (doc. 29).
The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N. D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a). It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see doc. 24).*fn1 Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 04-4181, with robbery (Ex. A at 2). Petitioner entered a written plea and sentencing recommendation agreement, pursuant to which he agreed to enter a "straight up" nolo contendere plea to the robbery charge and a violation of probation charge ("VOP") in Case No. 03- 2493, with no negotiated sentence and with the understanding that he could receive a maximum sentence of fifteen (15) years on the robbery charge and five (5) years on the VOP (id. at 151--55). The court accepted the plea at a hearing on May 9, 2005 (Ex. C at 239--47). Petitioner was sentenced on August 12, 2005, as a habitual felony offender to a term of ten (10) years of imprisonment on the robbery count, with presentence jail credit of 338 days. He was sentenced to a concurrent term of 27.6 months on the VOP, with presentence jail credit of 340 days (Ex. B).
Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"), Case No. 1D05-4250 (Exs. C, D, E, F). The First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam without written opinion on February 14, 2007, with the mandate issuing March 2, 2007 (Exs. G, H.). Stewart v. State, 948 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (Table). The First DCA denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on April 18, 2007 (Exs. I, J). Petitioner did not seek further review.
On May 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. K). On September 25, 2007, the state circuit court dismissed the motion without prejudice (Ex. L).
On October 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. M at 1--48). He subsequently amended his motion with an additional claim. In an order rendered June 10, 2008, the state circuit court summarily denied Petitioner's original and amended motions (id. at 70--126). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D08-3688 (id. at 127--28). The First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion on July 20, 2009, with the mandate issuing August 17, 2009 (Exs. Q, R). Stewart v. State, 13 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (Table).
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on October 13, 2009 (doc. 1 at 6). Respondent concedes the habeas petition is timely (doc. 24 at 3--4).
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. As the instant petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the more deferential standard for habeas review of state court decisions under § 2254 as brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218--19. In relevant part, section 2254(d) now provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).*fn2 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412--13 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2119--20, 147 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2000). In employing this test, the Supreme Court has instructed that on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal State court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71--72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" if Supreme Court precedent at the time "would have compelled a particular result in the case." Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 813, 835 (11th Cir. 2001).
Next, the court must determine whether the State court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law, either because "'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or because 'the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405--06). The Supreme Court has clarified that "[a]voiding these pitfalls does not require citation to our cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405--06). If the State court decision is found in either respect to be contrary, the district court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim.
If on the other hand, the State court applied the correct Supreme Court precedent and the facts of the Supreme Court cases and the petitioner's case are not materially indistinguishable, the court must go to the third step and determine whether the State court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The standard for an unreasonable application inquiry is "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. Whether a State court's decision was an unreasonable application of a legal principle must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2737--38, 159 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2004) (per curiam); cf. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 n.4, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 n.4, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002) (declining to consider evidence not presented to state court in determining whether its decision was contrary to federal law). An objectively unreasonable application of federal law occurs when the State court "identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case" or "unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). "In determining whether a state court's decision represents an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, a federal court conducting habeas review 'may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.'" Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411) (citing Harrington v. Richter, - U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786--87 (Jan. 19, 2011)). The AEDPA's "unreasonable application" standard focuses on the state court's ultimate conclusion, not the reasoning that led to it. See Gill, supra at 1291 (citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786). Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or could have supported the state court's decision, and then ask whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; see also Gill, supra, at 1292 (the federal district court may rely on grounds other than those articulated by the state court in determining that habeas relief was not warranted, so long as the district court did not err in concluding that the state court's rejection of the petitioner's claims was neither an unreasonable application of a Supreme Court holding nor an unreasonable determination of the facts).
Section 2254(d) also allows federal habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in State court where that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has clarified that: "a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (dictum). When performing its review under § 2254(d), the federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see e.g. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (explaining that a federal court can disagree with a state court's factual finding and, when guided by AEDPA, "conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence"); Jones v. Walker, 469 F.3d 1216, 1226--27 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 2254(d)(2)'s "unreasonable determination" standard "must be met by clear and convincing evidence," and concluding that that standard was satisfied where prisoner showed "clearly and convincingly" that the state court's decision "contain[ed] an 'unreasonable determination' of fact."). The "unreasonable determination of the facts" standard is only implicated to the extent that the validity of the state court's ultimate conclusion is premised on unreasonable fact finding. See Gill, 2010 WL 609844, at *18. A petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the record reflects an insufficient factual basis for affirming the state court's decision. Id.
Only if the federal habeas court finds that the petitioner satisfied AEDPA, and § 2254(d), does the court take the final step of conducting an independent review of the merits of the petitioner's claims. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 531 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007); Jones, 469 F.3d 1216 (same). The writ will not issue unless the petitioner shows that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Within this framework, the court will review Petitioner's claims.
A. Ground One: "The state trial court erred when it denied the Petitioner's motion to suppress pursuant to a non-consensual warrantless (entry) [sic] and illegal search and seizure."
Petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress (doc. 12 at 4; doc. 13 at 3--18). He contends the police coerced his girlfriend, Ms. Toni Marlin, to consent to law enforcement's entering the residence and searching it, by telling her that if she did not cooperate, she would be arrested and her child sent to the Department of Children and Family Services (id.). Petitioner contends the entry into the apartment and the search that followed, which resulted in the discovery of money, a bag, and statements by Ms. Marlin and Petitioner, violated the Fourth Amendment (id.). He further contends his confession at the police station should have been suppressed, because it was the fruit of his illegal arrest made as a result of the coerced consent search (doc. 13 at 11--12, 17). He argues the trial court erred in determining that Ms. Marlin voluntarily consented to the search (id. at 3--18).
Petitioner states he raised this claim on direct appeal of his conviction (doc. 12 at 4). He argues he did not receive a full and fair hearing on the Fourth Amendment issue, because the state court willfully and negligently disregarded clearly established Federal law (doc. 13 at 17--18). He additionally contends he did not receive meaningful appellate review of the claim, because he did not reserve the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress (doc. 29 at 6).
Respondent contends Petitioner's nolo contendere plea waived review of the Fourth Amendment issue for purposes of federal habeas (doc. 24 at 7--9). Respondent additionally contends this claim is barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) (id. at 4--7). Respondent argues further that, notwithstanding the Powell and waiver ...