This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17) filed on July 1, 2011. After an Order (Doc. #19) requesting a response, plaintiffs filed a Reply (Doc. #20). With leave of Court (Doc. #22), defendant filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Reply (Doc. #23).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). "To survive dismissal, the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). See also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). The former rule -- that "[a] complaint should be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief," La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) -- has been retired by Twombly. James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274. Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Dismissal is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989); Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff T&T Unlimited, LLC (T&T), a Florida limited liability company, and Leah Nees (Nees)(collectively plaintiffs), filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #3) (the Complaint) against the City of Labelle, Florida (the City or defendant). Plaintiffs wished to open a business to be known as "AC Enterprises" in the City of Labelle and needed occupational licenses for Automotive Repair, Welding/Fabrication, and Machine Shop. The proposed location for the business was at 435 S. Bridge Street, and plaintiffs were advised by the City Attorney that the location was permitted for such use. Plaintiffs obtained occupational licenses from the City, but on or about January 2009, moved the business to 329 S. Bridge Street.
Plaintiffs had a business relationship with the City for welding and fabrication jobs. On or about May 10, 2009, the City contacted plaintiffs regarding the construction of three trailers. After plaintiffs provided a written estimate, the City, through Mike Boyle, asked that the larger of the three trailers be completed for $1,800.00 instead of the estimated $3,600.00. Plaintiffs responded that based on the cost of materials they could not afford to do so at that price.
On or about May 14, 2009, Douglas Bostic (Bostic), an agent of the City, began investigating plaintiffs for ordinance violations involving fabrication and manufacture of trailers. On May 18, 2009, Bostic issued a Code Violation warning letter to plaintiffs relating to Ordinance 4-70.3. This ordinance provides for the creation of a "business general zone" for compatible retail enterprises having common characteristics and which do "not involve more than incidental or limited assembly, fabrication or storage of commodities." (Doc. #3, ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs' counsel responded that plaintiffs' primary business was not the manufacture of trailers and that they were permitted limited manufacture and fabrication of materials under the Ordinance. Despite this response, Bostic continued his investigation of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege that Bostic, despite knowing that there was no code violation, issue a series of code violation notices to plaintiffs: June 11, 2009 -- citation #2025; June 22, 2009 --citations #2077 and #2078; July 8, 2009 -- citation #2079; August 6, 2009 -- citation #2082; and August 10, 2009 -- citation #2083. (Id., ¶¶ 18-23.)
Citation Numbers 2077, 2078, and 2079 were set for hearing on August 24, 2009, but at the hearing the City's attorney dismissed the citations and stated he would seek redress through a new procedure in front of a hearing officer. Plaintiffs, through counsel, objected and sought a rehearing and dismissal with prejudice. (Id., ¶¶ 25-27.) The motion was set for a hearing, but was ultimately denied for lack of jurisdiction. (Id., ¶ 32.)
Bostic then issued a second series of code violation notices to plaintiffs: October 6, 2009 -- citations #2088 and #2089; October 14, 2009 -- citations #2090, #2091, and #2092; October 15, 2009 -- citations #2093 and #2094; and October 17, 2009 -- citation #2095. (Id., ¶¶ 33-40.) To mitigate their damages, plaintiffs relocated their business to a location outside the city limits, at 3113 Dellwood Terrace, in or about November 2009. (Id., ¶ 42.)
On April 1, 2010, after plaintiffs provided an updated notice of intent to sue, the City initiated action on citation numbers 2025, 2077, 2078, and 2088 through 2095 by mailing a notice of hearing before a Special Magistrate for each of the eleven citations. Some of the citations were never served on Nees, or her husband (Anthony Nees), and only one was served on Anthony Nees. (Id., ¶¶ 41, 43.) Plaintiffs served a motion to dismiss with prejudice, notice of expiration of speedy trial, and request to take judicial notice on April 14, 2010. (Id., ¶ 43.)*fn1 Bostic continued to harass and stalk customers and business associates of plaintiffs, and had direct or indirect contact or correspondence with plaintiffs' known business associates. (Id., ¶¶ 44-45.)
Plaintiffs have filed a thirty-five (35) count Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #3). Counts I through XIV are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and each count alleges that the issuance, prosecution, and refusal to set a hearing for a specific citation violated plaintiffs' due process rights. Count XV through Count XXVIII are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and each count alleges that two or more agents of the City conspired to violate plaintiffs' rights to due process under § 1985 by issuing a specific citation and refusing to set a hearing. Counts XXIX through XXXV are state law claims which each allege the City intentionally interfered with specifically identified third parties with whom plaintiffs had a business relationship by having direct contact with an agent of the third party.
Defendant argues that the Section 1983 counts fail to state a claim for either a substantive or procedural due process violation; the Section 1985 claims fail because no conspiracy or constitutional violation is alleged and because of the intercorporate conspiracy ...