This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Uncontested Petition for Award of Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter referred to as EAJA) (Doc. #25, Petition), which was filed November 10, 2011. Plaintiff's counsel requests an award of $2,902.50 in attorney fees and reimbursement of $350 in costs for the filing fee incurred in filing the complaint (see generally, Doc. #25). Plaintiff advises Defendant does not have an objection to the relief sought (Doc. #25, ¶ 6).
Based upon a review of the information contained within the record, the Court makes the following legal and factual findings:
1. Attorney fees are authorized in this action because Plaintiff, having obtained a sentence for remand/reversal of a denial of benefits, is a "prevailing party," Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993), and the Commissioner failed to apply the proper legal standards in evaluating the case. Therefore, the Commissioner's position here was not substantially justified. Moreover, Plaintiff filed a timely application for attorney fees. Plaintiff expressly states, "Plaintiff is not excluded from eligibility for an award under EAJA by any of the exclusions set forth in the Act" (Doc. #25, ¶ 5). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990).
2. The amount of attorney fees to be awarded "shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished," except that attorney fees shall not exceed $125 per hour unless the Court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a "special factor" justifies a higher fee award. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The awarded fee may not exceed twenty-five percent of the claimant's past due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). There is no contention here that the claimed fee would exceed that amount.
It has been recognized that the EAJA allows for an adjustment due to changes in the cost of living, though such a change is not absolutely required. Barber v. Sullivan, 751 F. Supp. 1542, 1544 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (citing Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988). Baker is also cited for the proposition that attorney fee increases do not necessarily have to follow the Cost of Living Index for a specific geographical area and that the decision as to whether attorney fees shall exceed the statutory cap rests entirely within the Court's discretion. Id. Plaintiff's counsel requests an enhancement of the statutory fee rate of $125 per hour based upon the cost of living increases since Congress set the amount in March 1996 as part of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 121, §§ 231-33 as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
Plaintiff's counsel argues that the statutory cap of $125 should be raised to $161.25 per hour for services provided in 2010 and 2011 (Doc. #25, ¶ 7). The Court in its discretion has determined that this hourly rate is reasonable when factoring in the Consumer Price Index as a guide for Florida attorneys to be compensated under the EAJA.*fn1
3. The Court's review must consider not only the reasonableness of the requested hourly rate for attorney fees, but also whether the number of hours claimed for attorney fees under the EAJA were reasonably expended. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff seeks compensation for eighteen (18) hours of legal work reported by Plaintiff's counsel in relation to this federal litigation. This number of hours falls squarely within the range of hours the Court typically sees reported for this type of litigation. Thus, the Court finds counsel's hours were reasonably expended in this case.
4. In light of Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2528-29 (2010) (establishing that any award of attorney fees under the EAJA is subject to offset by the government of any debt owed by the plaintiff to the United States), this Court finds it a better practice to award the EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff as the prevailing party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment of those fees. It is not the duty of the Court to determine whether Plaintiff owes a debt to the government that may be satisfied, in whole or in part, from the EAJA fees award. Thus, the Court leaves it to the discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA Fees and pay fees directly to Plaintiff counsel after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt (see Doc. #25, ¶ 9).
5. Plaintiff makes a claim for reimbursement costs incurred filing the complaint in this action. The Court finds that $350 for filing fees is a reasonable claim for costs in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a). As the Plaintiff's Assignment of EAJA Fee contains no reference to assignment of reimbursable costs, Plaintiff's counsel is directed to reimburse Plaintiff the $350 filing fee incurred to initiate this litigation, unless said cost was advanced on Plaintiff's behalf pursuant to Fla. R. Prof. Conduct 4-1.8(e).
6. The Court thus finds that $2,902.50 ($161.25 x 18 hours) is a reasonable amount for attorney fees in this case and $350 in costs for the filing fee is a reasonable cost.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Plaintiff's Uncontested Petition for Award of Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. #25) is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $2,902.50 for the EAJA attorney fees taxed under 24 U.S.C. § 2412(d), plus $350 in ...