This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant Jennifer LaCour's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 59). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition thereto (Doc. # 60). For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint ("Complaint") on May 26, 2011 (Doc. # 57) against LaCour and three corporate entities, Central Florida Investments, Inc., CFI Resort Management, Inc., and Cinnamon Cove GP # 26, Inc. The Complaint includes five counts. Count I alleges a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Count II alleges sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Count III alleges retaliation pursuant to Title VII. Count IV seeks relief for alleged sexual harassment under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). Count V alleges retaliation pursuant to the FCRA. All the Counts are asserted against the three corporate entities. The only claim against LaCour is a violation of the FLSA contained in Count I.
In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the facts section of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege:
6. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were "employees" of the Defendants within the meaning of FLSA, Title VII, and the FCRA, and Defendant LaCour was the supervisor of the Plaintiffs.
7. At all times material hereto, Defendants were an "employer" within the meanings of the FLSA, Title VII and the FCRA (excluding Defendant LaCour).
8. Defendants continue to be an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA, Title VII and the FCRA (excluding Defendant LaCour).
In Count I (FLSA), paragraph 19 alleges:
19. Jennifer LaCour was the supervisor for Victor Arean.
LaCour now moves for a judgment on the pleadings or to dismiss Count I with prejudice as a matter of law as to LaCour because Plaintiffs have not alleged that LaCour was an employer as defined by the FLSA. Plaintiffs respond that, in paragraphs 7 and 8, they meant to indicate that LaCour was not an employer under the FCRA or Title VII as there is no individual liability under those laws. Plaintiffs argue that they did not intend to exclude LaCour from their FLSA claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) directs that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment for the moving party is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id. "When a motion filed pursuant to [Rule] 12(c) raises a [Rule] 12(b)(6) defense, the court should apply the same ...