United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Gainesville Division
R. JONES United States Magistrate Judge.
before the Court is ECF No. 113, Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Granting Protective Order for
Dr. Regina Bussing. Plaintiff requests the Court to
reconsider the Court's recent order granting the motion
for protective order regarding the deposition of Dr. Regina
motion for reconsideration is “an extraordinary
remedy” and is only used sparingly. Pensacola
Firefighters' Relief Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 265
F.R.D. 589, 591 (N.D. Fla. 2010). Further, reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) “is not a vehicle for rehashing
arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting the
court's prior decision.” Wendy's Int'l,
Inc. v. Nu-Cape Constr., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D.
Ga. 1996). Although Rule 59(e) does not set forth the grounds
for relief, district courts in this circuit have identified
three that merit reconsideration of an order: (1) an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice. Sussman v. Salem, Saxon &
Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
None of those circumstances are present here.
argues that the Court did not address a pivotal issue which
is fundamental to Plaintiff's claims. According to
Plaintiff, one of the main issues in this case concerns the
policy at the Florida Recovery Center in 2011, which required
the admission of Plaintiff into a partial hospitalization
unit in order to be evaluated. Plaintiff says the policy
eventually was changed around 2014 to then only require
evaluation on an out patient basis. Plaintiff says the policy
changed when Dr. Bussing become Chair of the Department of
Psychiatry in 2014. As a result, Plaintiff says that Dr.
Bussing has personal knowledge concerning the change in
policy, which authorized evaluation on an out patient basis
rather than evaluation for a substance abuse disorder during
Court finds no reason to reconsider its previous order. The
Court did not fail to take into account the argument advanced
by Plaintiff. In her opposition to Defendant's motion for
protective order, Plaintiff argued that she needed to depose
Dr. Bussing regarding the 2014 change in the policy at the
Florida Recovery Center, which prior to 2014, required the
evaluation of patients for substance abuse disorders while
the patients were in partial hospitalization. Plaintiff says
the change in policy came about due to her complaints and
protests. The Court considered this argument, as well as the
variety of other reasons Plaintiff advanced, when the Court
determined that there was no reason for the deposition of Dr.
Bussing to go forward.
argument, advanced in her motion for reconsideration, ignores
the fact that the claims she describes are not part of the
remaining claims against Dr. Teitlebaum. Plaintiff's
remaining claims against Dr. Teitlebaum include § 1983
claims against Dr. Teitelbaum for fabrication of evidence
that led to Plaintiff allegedly being falsely imprisoned at
the Florida Recovery Center and which she says resulted in an
unlawful search and seizure, as well as a state law claim for
fraud regarding misrepresentations made to Plaintiff in 2011
about the procedures at the Florida Recovery Center.
policy of the Florida Recovery Center-which Plaintiff says
changed around 2014 to then allow for out patient evaluation,
rather than partial hospitalization-has nothing to do with
Dr. Teitelbaum's conduct in 2011, which allegedly
involved fabricating evidence, permitting an unlawful search
and seizure of Plaintiff, and communicating
misrepresentations about the policies and procedures of the
Florida Recovery Center to Plaintiff. There is no allegation
or suggestion in this case that Dr. Teitelbaum created the
policy in place in 2011, which required partial
hospitalization. In short, whatever personal knowledge Dr.
Bussing may have about the change in the partial
hospitalization policy that occurred around 2014 is
irrelevant to any of the claims remaining against Dr.
extent Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the propriety of
the policy at the Florida Recovery Center, which required
evaluation during partial hospitalization, rather than on an
out patient basis, Plaintiff ‘s claim, if any, is
against the University of Florida and those who created the
policies, and not Dr. Teitlebaum, an employee of the
University of Florida . Those claims are not part of this
case because the University of Florida Board of Trustees was
dismissed from this lawsuit based on Eleventh Amendment
Immunity. Consequently, if Plaintiff wishes to pursue claims
for damages against the University of Florida based upon the
partial hospitalization policies in effect in 2011, Plaintiff
would have to pursue those claims (assuming Plaintiff's
allegations state a claim) in state court but not in federal
the Court did not overlook Plaintiff's argument in
entering a protective order regarding Dr. Bussing's
deposition. While Dr. Bussing may know something about the
change in policy neither the propriety of the policy nor the
change in the policy have any relevance to Plaintiff's
remaining claims in this case against Dr. Teitlebaum.
upon due consideration, it is ORDERED:
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Granting Protective
Order for Dr. Regina ...