Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Walker v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

January 31, 2017

LISA WALKER, Plaintiff,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Defendant.

          ORDER

          SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 23). Plaintiff filed a response, partly in opposition and partly to drop some of her claims. (Doc. No. 45). As explained below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

         I. Standard of Review

         Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See id. (citation omitted). When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. (citation omitted).

         II. Background

         Plaintiff Lisa Walker, a white female, began working for Defendant Florida Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile detention officer in January of 2013.[1] Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment by various co-workers and supervisors throughout her employment. (Doc. No. 46). Plaintiff continuously reported the harassment, but the harassment continued. (Doc. No. 46).

         In December of 2014, Plaintiff asked Major Crespo to change her shift so she would not have to work with Sergeant Lewis (one of the alleged harassers). Major Crespo responded that if Plaintiff made another request or complaint about race discrimination, the Regional Office had instructed him that Plaintiff would be terminated. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 59). Plaintiff also spoke to Captain Nelson, who also said that if Plaintiff made any more complaints, the Regional Office would terminate her. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 59).

         On December 9, 2014, Plaintiff spoke to Frank Gargett in the Regional Office and asked to change her shift and supervisor (Sergeant Lewis was technically her supervisor). (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 60). Captain Nelson told Plaintiff that it was a mistake to contact Gargett. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 60).

         Nothing was done to stop the harassment, and Plaintiff decided to resign. Plaintiff turned in her letter of resignation on December 19, 2014, with an effective date of January 15, 2015. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 64).

         Prior to Plaintiff turning in her resignation letter, Sergeant Lewis made a comment that she (Lewis) “was resigning and was going to ‘get a boob job and work at Hooters.'” (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 65). Plaintiff thought Sergeant Lewis was joking, because she (Lewis) had made the same comment previously. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 65). Once Plaintiff realized that Sergeant Lewis was really resigning, Plaintiff asked Major Crespo on December 23rd, 24th, and 30th if she could rescind her resignation. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 66; Doc. No. 46-12).

         Plaintiff also spoke to Sergeant Rios about her desire to rescind her resignation. (Doc. No. 34-1, depo p. 143). Sergeant Rios spoke to Captain Nelson about whether Defendant was going to allow Plaintiff to rescind her resignation. Captain Nelson did not have the authority to rescind Plaintiff's resignation, but Sergeant Rios believed that Nelson's input would weigh heavily in the decision. (Doc. No. 34-1, depo p. 146). Captain Nelson responded to Sergeant Rios, “If this is our chance to get rid of her, we're going to get rid of her.” (Doc. No. 34-1, depo p. 144, 147-48). Ultimately, Major Crespo and Frank Gargett denied Plaintiff's requests to rescind her resignation. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 66).

         Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit and asserted twelve claims against Defendant. Because Plaintiff has dropped her gender-based discrimination and gender-based retaliation claims, as well as her Florida Whistleblower claim, only nine claims remain:[2] (1) race discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Title VII, and § 1983 based on Defendant's decision not to allow her to rescind her resignation - Counts I, V, and IX; (2) retaliation under the FCRA, Title VII, and § 1983 based on Defendant's decision not to allow her to rescind her resignation - Counts III, VII, and X; and (3) racially hostile work environment under the FCRA, Title VII, and § 1983 - Counts IV, VIII, and XI.

         III. Motion for Summary Judgment

         Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.[3] Accordingly, the Court will analyze ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.