United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
C. BUCKLEW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 23). Plaintiff filed a response,
partly in opposition and partly to drop some of her claims.
(Doc. No. 45). As explained below, Defendant's motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
Standard of Review
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant
and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor.
See Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.
2006)(citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial
burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on
file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that
should be decided at trial. See id. (citation
omitted). When a moving party has discharged its burden, the
non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by
its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See
id. (citation omitted).
Lisa Walker, a white female, began working for Defendant
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile
detention officer in January of 2013. Plaintiff contends that she
was subjected to a racially hostile work environment by
various co-workers and supervisors throughout her employment.
(Doc. No. 46). Plaintiff continuously reported the
harassment, but the harassment continued. (Doc. No. 46).
December of 2014, Plaintiff asked Major Crespo to change her
shift so she would not have to work with Sergeant Lewis (one
of the alleged harassers). Major Crespo responded that if
Plaintiff made another request or complaint about race
discrimination, the Regional Office had instructed him that
Plaintiff would be terminated. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 59).
Plaintiff also spoke to Captain Nelson, who also said that if
Plaintiff made any more complaints, the Regional Office would
terminate her. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 59).
December 9, 2014, Plaintiff spoke to Frank Gargett in the
Regional Office and asked to change her shift and supervisor
(Sergeant Lewis was technically her supervisor). (Doc. No.
46, ¶ 60). Captain Nelson told Plaintiff that it was a
mistake to contact Gargett. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 60).
was done to stop the harassment, and Plaintiff decided to
resign. Plaintiff turned in her letter of resignation on
December 19, 2014, with an effective date of January 15,
2015. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 64).
to Plaintiff turning in her resignation letter, Sergeant
Lewis made a comment that she (Lewis) “was resigning
and was going to ‘get a boob job and work at
Hooters.'” (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 65). Plaintiff
thought Sergeant Lewis was joking, because she (Lewis) had
made the same comment previously. (Doc. No. 46, ¶ 65).
Once Plaintiff realized that Sergeant Lewis was really
resigning, Plaintiff asked Major Crespo on December 23rd,
24th, and 30th if she could rescind her resignation. (Doc.
No. 46, ¶ 66; Doc. No. 46-12).
also spoke to Sergeant Rios about her desire to rescind her
resignation. (Doc. No. 34-1, depo p. 143). Sergeant Rios
spoke to Captain Nelson about whether Defendant was going to
allow Plaintiff to rescind her resignation. Captain Nelson
did not have the authority to rescind Plaintiff's
resignation, but Sergeant Rios believed that Nelson's
input would weigh heavily in the decision. (Doc. No. 34-1,
depo p. 146). Captain Nelson responded to Sergeant Rios,
“If this is our chance to get rid of her, we're
going to get rid of her.” (Doc. No. 34-1, depo p. 144,
147-48). Ultimately, Major Crespo and Frank Gargett denied
Plaintiff's requests to rescind her resignation. (Doc.
No. 46, ¶ 66).
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit and asserted twelve claims
against Defendant. Because Plaintiff has dropped her
gender-based discrimination and gender-based retaliation
claims, as well as her Florida Whistleblower claim, only nine
claims remain: (1) race discrimination under the Florida
Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Title VII, and §
1983 based on Defendant's decision not to allow her to
rescind her resignation - Counts I, V, and IX; (2)
retaliation under the FCRA, Title VII, and § 1983 based
on Defendant's decision not to allow her to rescind her
resignation - Counts III, VII, and X; and (3) racially
hostile work environment under the FCRA, Title VII, and
§ 1983 - Counts IV, VIII, and XI.
Motion for Summary Judgment
moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's
claims. Accordingly, the Court will analyze