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Hojan v. State

Supreme Court of Florida

January 31, 2017

GERHARD HOJAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. GERHARD HOJAN, Petitioner,
v.
JULIE L. JONES, etc., Respondent.

         NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

         An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Paul Lawrence Backman, Judge - Case No. 062002CF005900B88810 And an Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus

          Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Todd Gerald Scher, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Jessica Leigh Houston, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

          Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Krause Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

          PER CURIAM.

         Gerhard Hojan was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree premeditated murder, one count of attempted first-degree felony murder, three counts of armed kidnapping, and two counts of armed robbery. Hojan was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Hojan v. State, 3 So.3d 1204 (Fla.), cert. denied, Hojan v. Florida, 558 U.S. 1052 (2009).

         Hojan now appeals the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief but grant Hojan a new penalty phase based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016).[1]

         FACTS

         This Court summarized the relevant facts on direct appeal as follows:

Gerhard Hojan was charged with armed robbery, armed kidnapping, attempted murder, and murder arising out of the events of Monday, March 11, 2002. The evidence presented at Hojan's trial established that at approximately 4 a.m., Hojan and Jimmy Mickel entered the Waffle House where the victims, Barbara Nunn, Christina De La Rosa, and Willy Absolu worked. Hojan and Mickel had eaten at that Waffle House on several prior occasions, and the victims recognized and knew Hojan and Mickel. Mickel had also previously worked at that Waffle House. Additionally, Nunn knew Mickel and Hojan from attending a club where Mickel and Hojan worked and where they had previously admitted Nunn for free.
After eating breakfast, Mickel exited the Waffle House. He returned with a pair of bolt cutters and went toward the employee section of the restaurant. Hojan produced a handgun and ordered Nunn, De La Rosa, and Absolu into the back of the kitchen, where he directed them into a small freezer and shut them inside. While Mickel cut the locks to various cash stores, Hojan returned to the freezer a total of three times. First, Hojan returned and demanded that the victims give him any cell phones they had. Next, he returned and demanded their money. Finally, he returned and ordered the victims to turn around and kneel on the floor. Nunn protested and tried to persuade Hojan not to kill them, but Hojan nevertheless shot each of the victims. . . .
Nunn survived and awoke later with Absolu's legs on top of her body. She crawled out of the freezer and went next door to a gas station. There, with the help of the night attendant, she called 911 and subsequently her mother and sister. . . . Prior to her helicopter flight, Nunn gave law enforcement officers a taped statement, in which she identified Mickel and Hojan as being involved. . . .
Hojan was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the death of Absolu and De La Rosa; one count of attempted first-degree premeditated murder as to Nunn; one count of attempted first-degree felony murder as to Nunn; three counts of armed kidnapping; and two counts of armed robbery. State v. Hojan, No. 02-5900CF10B (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. sentencing order filed Aug. 2, 2005) at 1 (Sentencing Order). The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the trial court followed that recommendation and imposed two death sentences for the murders of Absolu and De La Rosa. In sentencing Hojan to death, the trial court found six aggravators, one statutory mitigator, and two nonstatutory mitigators. . . .
On appeal, Hojan raises five claims. He argues that (1) the surviving victim's statement to an officer at the scene was not an excited utterance; (2) the trial court improperly treated Hojan's waiver of the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase as a waiver of his opportunity to present motions challenging the death penalty; (3) his confession should have been suppressed; (4) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (5) the trial court committed error under Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1993), and Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla. 2001). We independently assess the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of Hojan's sentence. We find no error under Hojan's five asserted claims, find that sufficient evidence exists, and conclude that the death sentence is proportional. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order sentencing Hojan to death.

Hojan, 3 So.3d at 1207-09 (footnote omitted).

         On November 19, 2010, Hojan filed a "Motion to Vacate Judgment of Convictions and Sentences with Special Request for Leave to Amend, " raising nine claims, which the circuit court treated as Hojan's initial postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.[2]

         The circuit court entered an order that summarily denied all of Hojan's claims for postconviction relief. This appeal follows. Hojan also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.[3]

         ANALYSIS

         Standard of Review-Postconviction Motion

         We have previously established that there is a presumption that claims for relief sought in a rule 3.851 motion are presumptively entitled to a postconviction evidentiary hearing. However, the circuit court's summary judgment denying a defendant's rule 3.851 motion will be upheld if there is a conclusive showing that defendant is not entitled to relief, or the claim(s) is insufficiently pleaded.

"A defendant is normally entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction motion 'unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or particular claim is legally insufficient.' " Valentine v. State, 98 So.3d 44, 54 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011)). An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851 motion whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires factual determination. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So.2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000). "[T]o the extent there is any question as to whether a rule 3.851 movant has made a facially sufficient claim requiring a factual determination, the Court will presume that an evidentiary hearing is required." Walker v. State, 88 So.3d 128, 135 (Fla. 2012). However, merely conclusory allegations are not sufficient-the defendant bears the burden of "establishing a 'prima facie case based on a legally valid claim.' " Valentine, 98 So.3d at 54 (quoting Franqui, 59 So.3d at 96).
"To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in an initial postconviction motion, the record must conclusively demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to relief." Everett v. State, 54 So.3d 464, 485 (Fla. 2010). When reviewing the circuit court's summary denial of an initial rule 3.851 motion, we will accept the movant's factual allegations as true and will affirm the ruling only if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a facially sufficient claim, there is no issue of material fact to be determined, the claim should have been brought on direct appeal, or the claim is positively refuted by the record. See Walker, 88 So.3d at 135. Finally, "[b]ecause a court's decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review." Seibert v. State, 64 So.3d 67, 75 (Fla. 2010) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (holding that pure questions of law that are discernable from the record are subject to de novo review)).

Barnes v. State, 124 So.3d 904, 911 (Fla. 2013). As we explain below, we affirm the circuit court's summary denial of Hojan's motion for postconviction relief.

         Merits-Postconviction Motion

         Trial Court Error

         Hojan raised four subclaims pertaining to alleged trial court error: (1) failure to subject certain analysis of forensic evidence introduced by the State's expert witness to a Frye[4] hearing; (2) failure to inquire into whether Hojan knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda[5] rights; (3) failure to recognize that Hojan was entitled to relief under the Vienna Convention;[6] and (4) failure to disallow the jury selection process, as unorthodox and unconstitutional.

         In light of the record before us, we determine that the circuit court found conclusive evidence that Hojan was not entitled to relief based on any of the subclaims under his overall claim of trial court error. Notwithstanding the absence of trial court error, we specifically comment below about Hojan's assertion that the jury selection procedure in his case was unorthodox and unconstitutional.

         Frye Hearing

         Hojan asserts that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to address counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to challenge certain forensic evidence analysis in a Frye hearing. However, the record shows that the circuit court did not err in summarily denying this subclaim as being insufficiently pleaded and lacking merit. Relying on the authority of Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001), the circuit court rejected as conclusory Hojan's assertion that a 2009 report promulgated by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), pertaining to forensic science, established that tool mark and bullet rifling evidence did not satisfy the criteria for admissibility under Florida law.

         In addition, the circuit court did not err in concluding that Hojan's subclaim was insufficiently pleaded because he never alleged that the 2009 NAS report undermines the reliability of the analyses of forensic evidence in his case.

         In Ramirez we explained why the forensic evidence that Hojan challenged is generally admissible in criminal trials:

The theory underlying tool mark evidence . . . is generally accepted in the scientific community and has long been upheld by courts. Many of the analytical methods that were developed for use with tool marks in general have been applied to knife marks in particular and have similarly been accepted by courts.

Ramirez, 810 So.2d at 845. Furthermore, the circuit court did not err in summarily denying relief because it is well-established that "the Frye standard is the proper standard for admission of novel scientific expert testimony." Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997) (citing Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 188, 194-95 (Fla. 1989)).

         Furthermore, the circuit court did not err in summarily denying an evidentiary hearing regarding Hojan's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge allegedly conclusive testimony given by Carl Haemmerle, the State's expert witness. The circuit court properly ruled that Hojan failed to specify any information that counsel could have elicited during voir dire that would have warranted Haemmerle's exclusion as an expert. Thus, the circuit court properly concluded that Hojan insufficiently pleaded this sub-issue. See Barnes, 124 So.3d at 911 (stating merely conclusory statements are insufficient to establish the requirement for a factual determination).

         Miranda Waiver

         The circuit court did not err in summarily denying as procedurally barred Hojan's assertion that counsel was ineffective for not challenging during the suppression hearing the legal sufficiency of Hojan's waiver of his rights under Miranda. The circuit court correctly recognized that Hojan raised this issue during his direct appeal, where this Court rejected it as an argument of trial court error. Hojan, 3 So.3d at 1212 ("After hearing the testimony of several law enforcement officers, the trial court denied Hojan's motion . . . . The trial court found that (1) Detective Anton read Hojan his Miranda rights and asked Hojan if he understood those rights; (2) Hojan replied that he was read them and understood them; and (3) after Hojan affirmed that he had been read Miranda warnings, '[t]he Defendant was still willing to talk with [Anton]' on the tape . . . . Ultimately, the trial court held that Hojan was advised of his Miranda rights prior to being questioned and that he voluntarily waived those rights.") (footnote omitted). Contrary to Hojan's assertion that this precise issue presently before us was not previously addressed during his direct appeal, we disagree with Hojan and conclude, as did the trial court, that a criminal defendant may not relitigate any issue previously decided in his direct appeal, merely guised as an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective.

         Vienna Convention

         We find that there was conclusive evidence in the record to support the circuit court's finding that: (1) Hojan was born in the United States and he is still a citizen of this nation; and (2) Hojan was arrested and imprisoned for committing crimes in the United States (Florida).

         Therefore, despite Hojan's assertion that his father is a German national and his mother a Jamaican national, the circuit court correctly relied on existing case law in concluding that the Vienna Convention does not apply in Hojan's case. Compare Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 165-66 (Fla. 2002) (holding the Vienna Convention applied where a capital defendant, charged with first-degree murder in the United States, was a foreign national and citizen of the Bahamas), with Lugo v. State, 2 So.3d 1, 17-18 (Fla. 2008) (holding the Vienna Convention did not apply where the defendant, an American citizen in the Bahamas, sought for crimes committed in the United States, was arrested by Bahamian authorities at the request of United States officials).

         The circuit court reasonably concluded that even if Hojan had been able to become eligible for consular assistance from Germany or Jamaica, his rule 3.851 motion failed to allege that he would have sought such assistance under the Vienna Convention. Considering the record before us, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Hojan's rule 3.851 motion was insufficiently pleaded and conclusory. See Knight v. State, 923 So.2d 387, 403 (Fla. 2005) ("Conclusory allegations without more are insufficient to state a claim for relief in post conviction proceedings." (citing Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989); Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 2000))); Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1061 ("The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden." (citing Kennedy, 547 So.2d at 912)); Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998) ("We have encouraged trial courts to hold evidentiary hearings on postconviction motions. However, where the motion lacks sufficient factual allegations, or where alleged facts do not render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the motion may be summarily denied.").

         Jury Selection Procedure

         Hojan's allegation that his defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney colluded to select the jury at a time when he was not present and participating with his defense team initially caused us great concern. It is a well-settled proposition of law, which the circuit court acknowledged in its final order, that a criminal defendant has a right to be present at every critical stage of his or her trial. See Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 351 (Fla. 2001) ("Criminal defendants have a due process right to be physically present in all critical stages of trial, including the examination of prospective jurors.")

         The record before us reflects that Hojan was present during the voir dire of the entire venire that took place in open court, on the record, and before the presiding judge. In addition, Hojan was present for all of the cause challenges of the potential jurors and the trial court's rulings thereon on the record. After reviewing the record before us, we find that the unusual procedure employed in the selection of Hojan's jury did not violate his rights to due process under the law.

         The unusual aspect of the jury selection process occurred when counsel for the parties agreed, sometime after the close of the trial proceedings for the day prior to the intervening weekend, to forego the exercise of any peremptory challenges to any of the remaining venirepersons. At that time, off the record and when Hojan and the presiding judge were not present, the attorneys agreed on twelve jurors and four alternate jurors. On the following Monday, counsel informed the trial court, on the record, that they had mutually agreed to the jury and the alternates by way of the aforementioned out-of-court jury selection procedure. The trial court granted defense counsel approximately forty-five minutes to confer with Hojan about the stated jury selection procedure. Afterward, the trial judge conducted an extensive colloquy with Hojan to ensure that he agreed to the jury and ratified the jury selection procedure that his defense counsel had engaged in with the prosecution.

THE COURT: Mr. Hojan, the individuals whose names I've called out-you've been sitting here since we started picking this jury last Tuesday; is that correct?
MR. HOJAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you had an opportunity Tuesday and Wednesday-even though we dismissed the panel that were here Tuesday and Wednesday until we started again in the afternoon- you've been here participating with your lawyers through every stage of the jury selection process; correct?
MR. HOJAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you've consulted with your lawyers as it relates to the challenges for cause that were ...

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