FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Robert J. Egan,
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J.
Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona.
for Appellant. David Frakt, of Law Office of David Frakt,
Orlando, for Appellee.
State of Florida appeals an amended final order granting
Grounds Three and Eight of Isaac Anderson's
postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. The State
argues that the postconviction court erred in vacating two of
Anderson's convictions: namely, Count Three, fleeing and
eluding, and Count Four, resisting arrest without violence
because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised
in Grounds Three and Eight do not concern those
convictions. We agree and reverse.
was found guilty at trial of two counts of aggravated battery
on a police officer with a deadly weapon (Counts One and
Two), one count of fleeing and eluding, and one count of
resisting arrest without violence. The charges arose after
officers in marked police vehicles performed a dynamic
takedown of the stolen Ford Focus that Anderson was driving.
The takedown resulted in multiple collisions between the Ford
Focus and two police cars. After these initial collisions,
Anderson fled. Officers, aided by an Orange County
Sheriff's Office chase helicopter, pursued Anderson for
over five miles until he stopped the Ford Focus in the Pine
Hills neighborhood of Orlando. Once stopped, the Ford Focus
was rear-ended by a pursuing police car. Anderson and his
passenger, Laron Johnson,  jumped out of the car and fled on foot.
They were apprehended a short time later.
his convictions and sentences had been affirmed, Anderson
moved for postconviction relief, raising eleven grounds. Only
Grounds Three and Eight are relevant to this appeal.
Three argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to interview and call Johnson as a witness at trial.
According to Anderson, Johnson's testimony would have
contradicted the testimony of the police officers regarding
the damage to the Ford Focus as it related to the aggravated
battery counts. Ground Eight alleged that Anderson's
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire and present
testimony from an accident reconstruction expert.
holding an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court
granted Anderson's motion and vacated and set aside his
judgment and sentences. The State filed a motion seeking
clarification as to the specific grounds on which the
postconviction court granted the motion and, since the motion
only addressed the aggravated battery convictions, whether
the postconviction court intended to vacate Anderson's
convictions for fleeing and eluding and resisting without
amended order, the postconviction court clarified that it had
granted relief on Grounds Three and Eight only, that it had
summarily denied all the other grounds, and that it had
vacated Anderson's convictions on all four counts. This
assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law
and fact. Hitchcock v. State, 991 So.2d 337, 346
(Fla. 2008) (citing Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766,
771-72 (Fla. 2004)); Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d
1028, 1031-32 (Fla. 1999) (citing Rose v. State, 675
So.2d 567 (Fla. 1996)). Deference is given to the
postconviction court's factual findings if they are
supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.
Hitchcock, 991 So.2d at 346 (citing Sochor,
883 So.2d at 771-72); State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120,
132-33 (Fla. 2003) (citing Stephens, 748 So.2d at
1031-34). The postconviction court's legal conclusions
and its application of the law to the facts are reviewed de
novo. Hitchcock, 991 So.2d at 346 (citing
Sochor, 883 So.2d at 771-72); Coney, 845
So.2d at 132-33 (citing Stephens, 748 So.2d at
counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel "when
counsel's performance falls outside the range of
reasonable professional assistance and when there is a
reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding
would have been different but for the inadequate
performance." Larry v. State, 61 So.3d 1205,
1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). This standard
requires the defendant to show, first, that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient such that it falls
below the minimum standard of reasonableness set by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and, second,
prejudice arising from that deficient performance. Morris
v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 827-28 (Fla. 2006) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
attorney's performance is analyzed with great deference
under an objective standard of reasonableness. Bradley v.
State, 33 So.3d 664, 671 (Fla. 2010). An attorney's
performance is constitutionally acceptable if the attorney
renders reasonably competent and effective assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (citing Trapnell v.
United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Mistakes and errors made by counsel, including unreasonable
errors, are not sufficient to set aside the judgment unless
the error ...