United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MORALES HOWARD United States District Judge
CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore, have an
obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction.
See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277,
1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation exists regardless
of whether the parties have challenged the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“It is well settled that a federal court is obligated
to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). “In a
given case, a federal district court must have at least one
of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1)
jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or
(3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128
F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
January 13, 2017, Defendant Winebago Industries (Winebago)
filed a notice of removal notifying the Court of its intent
to remove this action to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, and
purporting to set forth the facts establishing that the Court
has jurisdiction over this action. See Defendant
Winebago's Notice of Removal (Doc. 1; Notice), at 1-3.
Specifically, Winebago asserts that the Court has
jurisdiction because there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75, 000.00, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1332, and therefore, this action is removable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441. See id. at 2. Additionally,
Winebago contends that the Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over any other claims asserted in the complaint,
see Complaint (Doc. 2; Complaint), pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441(c). In support of its assertions,
Winebago declares that “as set forth in the Complaint,
… Plaintiffs, Mark Venson and Helen Venson are
citizens of the State of Florida.” Id. at 2,
¶ 3. However, although Winebago asserts that Plaintiffs
Mark Venson and Helen Venson (collectively, Plaintiffs) are
citizens of Florida, a review of the complaint discloses that
Plaintiffs merely “own property in Duval County,
Florida, and purchased a recreational vehicle … in St.
Johns County Florida.” See Complaint ¶
This allegation does not adequately identify Plaintiffs'
citizenship, and thus, the Court is without
sufficient information to satisfy its jurisdictional inquiry.
court to have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), “all plaintiffs must be diverse from
all defendants.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at
412. A natural person's citizenship is determined by her
“domicile, ” or “the place of h[er] true,
fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment . . .
to which [s]he has the intention of returning whenever [s]he
is absent therefrom.” McCormick v. Aderholt,
293 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation and
citation omitted). Because the Notice alleges Plaintiffs'
citizenship by citing to the Complaint, which discloses only
that Plaintiffs own property in Florida, rather than their
domicile or state of citizenship, the Court finds that
Winebago has not alleged the facts necessary to establish the
Court's jurisdiction over this case. In light of the
foregoing, the Court will give Winebago an opportunity to
establish diversity of citizenship between the parties and
that this Court has jurisdiction over the
action. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
Winebago Industries shall have up to and including April
21st, 2017, to provide the Court with additional
information demonstrating that this Court has diversity
jurisdiction over this action.
 In fact, Exhibit A of the Notice
suggests that Plaintiffs may be citizens of Nevada.
See Notice, Ex. A: W. Scott Powell E-mail.
 Indeed, carefully ascertaining the
citizenship of the parties and whether the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this action is more than just an
academic exercise, as is evident from two recent Eleventh
Circuit cases. See Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Materials
Corp of Am., __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 816224, at **1-2 (11th
Cir. Mar. 2, 2017) (vacating summary judgment order after
three years of litigation where court determined on appeal
that the pleadings below had not sufficiently alleged the
citizenship of a defendant limited liability company, and
upon further inquiry, found that the defendant limited
liability company had a non-diverse member); see also
Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., __ F.3d
2017 WL 1046103, at *2, 7 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017)
(discussing whether sanctions were warranted in a case where
summary judgment was reversed on appeal after the appellate
court discovered that the pleadings did not sufficiently
allege the citizenship of the plaintiff LLC, leading to the
realization that there was no diversity jurisdiction)
(“While the requirements of diversity jurisdiction in
this scenario are complicated, they are the law. No party in
this case acted with bad intentions, but the result was a
colossal waste of time and effort. We trust that the damage
done to the parties' credibility, finances, and time is
enough of a sanction to curb their conduct and to serve as a
warning to future diversity jurisdiction litigants. In the
end, when the parties do not do their part, the burden falls
on the courts to make sure parties satisfy the requirements
of diversity jurisdiction. We must be vigilant in forcing
parties to meet the unfortunate demands of diversity
jurisdiction in the 21st century.”).
The party seeking to invoke the
Court's diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
jurisdictional prerequisites are met. See McCormick,
293 F.3d at 1257; see also Taylor v. Appleton, 30
F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (“notng that the
“pleader must ...