final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for
Miami-Dade County, Lower Tribunal No. 14-30412 Jose M.
Offices of Yoder & Ohanian, LLC, and Sebastian Ohanian,
Richard Lorenzo, for appellees.
LAGOA, SALTER, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Rios ("Rios") appeals from a non-final order
denying his motion for summary judgment. Appellees,
defendants below, Miami's Garage, Inc. ("Miami's
Garage"), and Professional Lien and Title Service, Corp.
("Professional Lien") (collectively
"Defendants"), move to dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
filed an action against Defendants for the purported taking
and titling of a Lamborgini. The parties agree that Rios and
Miami's Garage entered into an agreement to repair the
vehicle. The parties do not agree on what occurred next. Rios
asserted that Miami's Garage ceased working on the
vehicle over a dispute about the amount of time the repairs
were taking and Miami's Garage asserted that Rios was
responsible for supplying the parts to repair the vehicle but
failed to do so. Both parties agree that Miami's Garage
hired Professional Lien to place a lien on the vehicle and to
auction the vehicle at a public auction. Because no bids were
made on the vehicle in excess of the lien amount, Miami's
Garage prevailed on the lien claim. Following the auction,
Professional Lien made an application for title to the
vehicle, which was subsequently approved in the name of
and the Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
A hearing was held on the cross-motions and the trial court
entered an order that stated: "Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment . . . is denied [and] Defendants'
cross motion for summary judgment is taken under
advisement." This appeal ensued.
move to dismiss this appeal as taken from a non-final,
non-appealable order. In response to the motion to dismiss,
Rios contends that the trial court's order is an
appealable order because it denies him immediate possession
of property under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
unpersuaded by Rios's argument, as the trial court's
order did not determine that any party was entitled to
immediate possession of the vehicle. See Profile Invs.,
Inc. v. Delta Prop., Inc., 957 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007) (dismissing appeal of order as non-final and
non-appealable where "order [did] not directly determine
the immediate right to possession of property"); cf.
Thunderbird, Ltd., v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 470 So.2d 2, 3
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (denying motion to dismiss appeal and
finding that interlocutory order that ordered receiver to
take exclusive possession of property was an appealable
non-final order pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii)). Indeed,
the order merely denies Rios's motion for summary
judgment and reserves ruling on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. An order denying a motion for summary
judgment does not ...