United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MORRIS T. BURNEY, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al, Respondents.
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN United States District Judge.
initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)
(Petition) and a Memorandum in Support of the Petition (Doc.
2) (Memorandum). He challenges a 1988 state court (Duval
County, Florida) judgment of conviction for murder and
kidnapping, for which he is serving life imprisonment.
Respondents contend that the Petition was untimely filed, and
therefore, this case must be dismissed. See Motion
to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14)
(Motion).Petitioner filed a Reply to State's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) (Reply). The case is ripe for
One-Year Limitations Period
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
is no dispute that Petitioner's conviction in this case
became final before AEDPA's effective date (April 24,
1996). Thus, he had until April 24, 1997 to file a federal
habeas corpus petition. Between the effective date of AEDPA
and the expiration of the one-year limitations period,
Petitioner did not have any properly filed post-conviction
motions or other requests for collateral relief pending.
Thus, Petitioner's deadline to file a federal habeas
petition expired on April 24, 1997, without the filing of any
motions that would toll that time. While Petitioner filed
motions after the expiration of the one-year limitations
period, such filings did not toll the limitations period
because the period had already expired. See Sibley v.
Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating
that where a state prisoner files post-conviction motions in
state court after the AEDPA limitations period has expired,
those filings cannot toll the limitations period because
“once a deadline has expired, there is nothing left to
toll”); Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“Under §
2244(d)(2), even ...