United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Ocala Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
R. LAMMENS United States Magistrate Judge
appeals the administrative decision denying her applications
for Disability .Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Upon a review
of the .record, the memoranda, and the applicable law, I
submit that the Commissioner's decision should be
December 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI
benefits, alleging disability beginning February 28, 2009.
(Tr. 202-08, 209-15). The claim was denied initially, and
upon reconsideration. At Plaintiffs request, a hearing was
held on August 22, 2014, where both the Plaintiff and an
impartial vocational expert testified. On September 19, 2014.
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a notice of
unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr.
19-36). Plaintiffs request for review was denied by the
Appeals Council (Tr. 1-4), and Plaintiff initiated this
action on April 8, 2016. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has exhausted
her administrative remedies, and the final decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §
on a review of the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: major depression, obsessive
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, personality disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, bipolar disorder, hypertension, and migraine
headaches. (Tr. 21).
found that the Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
to perform less than the full range of medium work. (Tr. 23).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff can occasionally lift and/or
carry fifty pounds, and frequently lift and/or carrying
twenty-five pounds. She can sit, stand, and walk for six
hours each in an eight-hour day. The claimant can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds. The claimant should avoid exposure to
extremes in temperatures, and workplace hazards such as
moving machinery and unprotected heights. She can perform
simple tasks and make simple work-related decisions. The
claimant can have no more than occasional contact with
co-workers and supervisors, and is unable to interact with
the public. That time off task be accommodated by normal
upon his RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
can perform, such as kitchen helper, laundry worker, and cook
helper. (Tr. 34-35). The ALJ's finding includes his
consideration of Plaintiffs limitations that erode the
unskilled medium occupational base, and the vocational
expert's testimony regarding what functions Plaintiff
could perform in light of her limitations. (Tr. 35).
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not
disabled. (Tr. 35-36).
Standard of Review
claimant is entitled to disability benefits when he or she is
unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to either result in death or
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §§416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis
for evaluating a claim of disability, which is by now
well-known and otherwise set forth in the ALJ's decision.
See 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a);
see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). The claimant, of course, bears the burden of
persuasion through step four and, at step five, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987).
scope of this Court's review is limited to a
determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d
1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988)(citing Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). Indeed, the
Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla - i.e., the
evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the
existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560
(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards
v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if
the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder
of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner's decision.
Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v.
Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). This is
clearly a deferential standard.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her
mental impairments and improperly concluded that she could
maintain full-time employment. However, other than citing to
various mental health records, all of which the ALJ expressly
considered, Plaintiff fails to explain how the ALJ erred in
evaluating the evidence or how the records support greater
limitations than those included in the RFC. After reviewing
the record, I submit that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff s mental limitations, and
thus, his decision should be affirmed.
discussed Plaintiffs treatment for mental health issues which
does not support disabling limitations. In January 2012,
Plaintiff was seen by Anna B. Schwait, a psychiatric mental
health nurse practitioner at Archer Family Health Care. (Tr.
478-81). Plaintiff reported "doing terrible" and
stated that she has been dealing with inattentiveness all of
her life. Plaintiffs mental status assessment was normal and
she was diagnosed with bipolar II disorder, posttraumatic