United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division
ORDER
ROY B.
DALTON JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
cause is before the Court on the following:
1. Motion for Summary Judgment By Defendant Brown (Doc. 60),
filed February 28, 2017;
2. Plaintiff's Motion and Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71),
filed April 21, 2017; and
3. Reply Memorandum of Law by Defendant Brown (Doc. 72),
filed April 26, 2017.
I.
Background [1]
The
events leading to this action arose late in the evening of
August 22, 2011, when two deputies employed with the Brevard
County Sheriff's Office-Juan Vargas
(“Vargas”) and Zachary Brown
(“Brown”)-spotted Plaintiff Jermaine Kent
(“Kent”) riding a dirt bike while holding onto
the driver's window of a moving vehicle
(“Vehicle”). (Id. ¶ 5; Doc. 1,
¶ 7.) Without triggering the lights or sirens of their
unmarked and darkly tinted car (“Car”), Vargas
and Brown drove through a stop sign and begin to approach
Kent at a high rate of speed. (Doc. 69-1, p. 1; Doc. 67, pp.
22, 26.) Unaware of who was in the Car, Kent believed he was
about to be robbed, so he dropped his bike and ran.
(Id. at 22, 25.)
Exiting
the Car, Brown pursued Kent on foot. (Id. at 27.)
Once Plaintiff realized that he was being chased by law
enforcement, he immediately stopped, fell to his knees, put
his hands in the air, and was completely
compliant.[2] (Doc. 69-1, p. 1.) Despite
Kent's compliance, Brown tackled him, causing Kent to
fall to the ground with his face situated on a mound of fire
ants. (Id.) Once Kent informed Brown that his face
was on an ant pile Brown responded by telling him to,
“put [his] fucking face in the ant moun[d].”
(Id.) Brown then “purposefully” held
Kent's face in the ant mound, causing Kent to suffer
hundreds of ant bites to his face, ears, neck, chest and
eyes. (Id.; Doc. 60-5.) Both Vargas and Brown
subsequently tased Kent as he lay facedown. (Doc. 69-1, pp.
1-2; Doc. 67, p. 28.) Kent was not resisting, threatening,
fighting, or engaging in any other unlawful behavior when
Brown held his head down in the ant mound or when he was
tased. (Id. at 22; Doc. 69-1, p. 1.)
Based
on this incident, Kent was arrested and charged with
resisting an officer without violence
(“Resisting Charge”) in
violation of Florida Statute § 843.02, a first degree
misdemeanor. (Doc. 60-4.) He entered a plea of nolo
contendere and was adjudicated guilty on November 8,
2013. (Doc. 60-4.) Kent subsequently brought this 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 excessive force action against Vargas and Brown
in their individual capacities. (Doc. 1
(“Complaint”).)
Kent
served the Complaint on Brown on June 22, 2015 (see
Doc. 15), but failed to timely serve Vargas (see
Docs. 30, 31). The Court, therefore, dismissed this case as
to Vargas pursuant to Local Rule 3.10, for lack of
prosecution. (Id.) Brown, the only remaining
defendant, now moves for summary judgment, invoking defenses
under the doctrine of qualified immunity and Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 60
(“Motion”).) Kent has responded
(Doc. 71), and Brown has replied. (Doc. 72.) This matter is
now ripe for the Court's adjudication.
II.
Legal Standards
A.
Summary Judgment
A party
is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also,
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, courts
must not make credibility assessments or weigh conflicting
evidence. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co.,
9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993). Rather, courts must: (1)
view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party; and (2) draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. See White v. Pauly,
137 S.Ct. 548, 550 (2017). If a reasonable fact finder could
draw more than one inference from the facts and find that at
least one of those inferences creates an issue of material
fact, the court must not grant summary judgment. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
B.
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