United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MORALES HOWARD United States District Judge
CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Charles McCoy's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Doc. 1; Petition) and Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2; Motion), both filed on
June 9, 2017. In his Petition, McCoy seeks “certiorari
review of the termination of his parental rights”
pursuant to “Rule 60(b)(1) and (3)” of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). See
Petition at 1. According to McCoy, a state court in Duval
County terminated his parental rights in a decision issued on
August 25, 2016. Id. at 2. Although McCoy appealed
this decision, the Florida First District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's ruling, and denied McCoy's
motion for a rehearing and written opinion. Id. As
such, McCoy initiated this action in which he seeks to have
this Court review the decision terminating his parental
rights and “issu[e] an order directing the trial
[court] and the Respondent [the Florida Department of
Children and Families (DCF)] to give [McCoy] a meaningful
opportunity to complete a court ordered case plan with the
goal of reuniting [McCoy] with his children.”
Id. at 23. In the Motion, McCoy asserts that DCF
intends to allow the adoption of his children, and seeks a
“preliminary injunction prohibiting [DCF] from
proceeding with any adoption proceedings related to the minor
children in this case.” See Motion at 2-3.
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore have
an obligation to inquire into their subject matter
jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co.,
243 F.3d 1277, 1279 - 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation
exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S.
Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is
obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). If at any
time the Court determines it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, “the court must dismiss the
action.” See Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Rule(s)).
Petition, McCoy is asking this Court to review, overturn or
interfere with a state court judgment. However, pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over such a request. “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal
district courts cannot review state court final judgments
because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or,
as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”
Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482). Indeed,
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “[i]t is
well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction
to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court
decision.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626
(11th Cir. 1997). Upon review of the Petition, it is apparent
that McCoy seeks to have his Petition serve as an appeal to
this Court of the final decision of the Florida state court
regarding his parental rights, and asks this Court to
overturn that decision. Because the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this request, the Court determines
that this action is due to be dismissed. Likewise, because
the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear
McCoy's request, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
will be denied. In light of the foregoing, it is
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any pending
motions and deadlines and close the file.
 The Court notes that McCoy fails to
allege any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over
this case, and the Court independently can discern none.
Rather, McCoy appears to believe that this Court sits as an
appellate court over the Florida District Courts of Appeal.
McCoy alleges that his Petition is permitted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101(c). See Petition at 1. However, 28
U.S.C. § 2101 governs petitions for writ of certiorari
before the United States Supreme Court. As such, the statute
cited is not applicable to McCoy's petition before this
Court, a United States District Court. Regardless, for the
reasons set forth below, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider McCoy's requests under the
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 ...