United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN United States District Judge
Vernon Robinson, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing a pro se § 2241 Habeas
Corpus Petition (Doc. 1, Petition) on June 4, 2014, which he
supplemented on August 28, 2014 (Doc. 15, Supp.
Pet.). Robinson also filed an appendix (Doc. 3,
Pet. App.) and a supplemental appendix (Doc. 2, Supp.
App.). Robinson is in state custody, incarcerated
at Union Correctional Institution (Union County), pursuant to
a 1982 (Duval County) judgment of conviction for armed
robbery with a deadly weapon, for which he was sentenced to
sixty years' imprisonment. In grounds one through nine,
Robinson challenges the computation of his sentence by the
Department of Corrections (DOC) with respect to gain time and
other credit for time served. Petition at 3-4. In grounds ten
through twelve, Robinson challenges the calculation of his
presumptive parole release date (PPRD) by the Florida
Commission on Offender Review (FCOR). Petition at 14-16; Supp.
Pet. at 1-2. “Presumptive parole release date”
means the tentative parole release date as determined by
objective parole guidelines. See Fla. Stat. §
DOC responded (Doc. 16, DOC Response) to grounds one through
nine, asserting that Robinson's claims are untimely,
meritless, and not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. DOC
Response at 11 & n.4, 12. Robinson replied (Doc. 17,
Reply to DOC).
FCOR responded (Doc. 29, FCOR Response) to grounds ten
through twelve, asserting that Robinson's claims are
untimely and unexhausted. Alternatively, Respondent contends
that Robinson's claims are meritless. Robinson replied
(Doc. 30, Reply to FCOR).
case is ripe for review.
Pertinent Procedural History 
1982, the state court entered a judgment of conviction and
sentenced Robinson to a term of sixty years imprisonment.
FCOR Resp. Ex. D. In 1984, the FCOR established
Robinson's initial PPRD of August 16, 2009. FCOR Resp.
Ex. E. Following several reviews that resulted in adjustments
to his PPRD (see id.), Robinson was eventually
released on parole supervision on November 12, 1996. FCOR
Resp. Ex. F. After Robinson violated the terms and conditions
of his parole supervision several times, the FCOR revoked his
parole on October 15, 2003. FCOR Resp. Ex. F. Robinson
unsuccessfully challenged the revocation of his parole in
state court. See FCOR Response at 4, n.2 & Ex.
revocation of parole, on June 23, 2004, the FCOR established
Robinson's new PPRD of December 28, 2019. FCOR Resp. Ex.
H. On July 10, 2004, Robinson administratively appealed the
FCOR's decision establishing his PPRD. Id. After
reviewing Robinson's appeal, the FCOR found on August 11,
2014, that the issues Robinson raised in his administrative
review request did not merit modification of his PPRD.
Id. Robinson challenged the FCOR's decision by
filing a petition for a writ of mandamus in state circuit
court, which the court denied on August 26, 2005. FCOR Resp.
the FCOR has re-interviewed Robinson at least five
times. Other than one six-month reduction, his
PPRD has remained unchanged. FCOR Resp. Ex. J. As such, his
current PPRD is June 28, 2019. Id.
One-year Limitations Period
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs petitions filed after its effective date of April 24,
1996. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792
(2001). The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Where a petitioner asserts multiple
claims with different dates triggering the statute of
limitations under § 2244(d)(1), the applicable trigger
date is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. Zack v.
Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 926 (11th Cir. 2013).
§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitations period begins to run on
“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” Brown v. Barrow,
512 F.3d 1304, 1307 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)); see also Hawes v.
Howerton, 335 F. App'x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2009);
Ray v. Mitchem, 272 F. App'x 807, 809-10 (11th
Cir. 2008). Once triggered, the limitations period can be
tolled in two ways: through statutory tolling or equitable
tolling. Brown, 512 F.3d at 1307; seealso 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory
tolling); Damren v. Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 821 (11th
Cir. 2015) (“When a prisoner files for habeas corpus
relief outside the ...