Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Grawbadger v. Geo Care, LLC

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division

June 15, 2017

WILLIAM P. GRAWBADGER, Plaintiff,
v.
GEO CARE, LLC, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DONALD SAWYER, Dr., REBECCA JACKSON, Dr., FNU KILGO, C.O., FNU FOSSI, [1]C.O., and JOHN DOE 1-6, Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          JOHN E. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter comes before the Court upon review of the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants Donald Sawyer, Rebecca Jackson, and FNU Fausi (Doc. #28, Motion). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. #34, Response) and included attachments (Doc. #34-1), which are not pertinent for review at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. This case is ripe for review.

         I. Facts

         Plaintiff William Grawbadger, a resident who is civilly detained at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. #1, Complaint). Liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to state a medical deliberate indifference claim, an excessive use of force claim, and a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff names as Defendants GEO Care, LLC, the Florida Department of Children and Families, and the following individuals in their official and individual capacities who work at the FCCC: Doctor Donald Sawyer, Doctor Rebecca Jackson, Correctional Officer Kilgo, Correctional Officer Fausi, and John Does 1-6.

         According to the Complaint, on January 29, 2014, Plaintiff attempted to speak with Doctor Jackson “concerning treatment issues.” Complaint at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Doctor Jackson refused to speak to him and then went to speak privately to Correctional Officer Fausi. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff states he attempted to leave to return his living quarters, but Fausi “put his hand out and grabbed my upper arm to restrain me.” Id. Unit manager Price, who is not named as a Defendant, “came to see what was happening.” Plaintiff states “upon [Fausi] being disengaged from [Plaintiff's] arm, [Fausi] then grabbed [Plaintiff] violently and forced [Plaintiff] to the ground.” Id.

         Plaintiff claims several FCCC security officers then arrived and two sat on Plaintiff's shoulders and two grabbed his legs, including Defendant Kilgo. Id. Plaintiff alleges Kilgo placed his knee in the back of Plaintiff's head and “ground Plaintiff's face and head into the tiled, hallway floor.” Id. Kilgo “placed the knuckle of his right hand into a pressure point behind my left ear and pressed.” Id. Fausi and Kilgo “then tried to break my arms to force handcuffs on [Plaintiff's] wrists.” Id. “Upon putting handcuffs on [Plaintiff], the officer then picked [Plaintiff] up.” Id.

         Plaintiff claims he was refused “immediate medical treatment, ” “marched to confinement, ” and placed in a suicide/observation cell at the FCCC that had no bunk, desk, or stool. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Fausi told Plaintiff to remove his shoes. Kilgo then grabbed Plaintiffs' shoes and “wrenched them off [Plaintiff's feet].” Plaintiff claims he remained handcuffed for “20-23 [sic].” Id. at 6.

         After “getting off the floor” and “hobbling to the door, ” Plaintiff alleges he looked out the door and saw Facility Administrator, Doctor Donald Sawyer present. Plaintiff claims “he brought to Sawyer's attention [Plaintiff's] injuries.” Id. Plaintiff states he was kept in “confinement” for two weeks. Id. During this time, Plaintiff alleges “he refused all food for fear [he] would be poisoned.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he was denied mattress, bedding, and hygiene items for 12 hours. Id. Plaintiff states he was charged with disciplinary infractions and ultimately had a disciplinary hearing, during which his charges were reduced to minor infractions. Id. Plaintiff believes that because he “was victorious in a previous Civil Rights Complaint against the Institution that [he] is being harassed and punished at every opportunity.” Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and declaratory relief. Id. at 10-11.

         II. Standard of Review

         In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court limits its consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court must accept all factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001).

         The Court employs the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard when reviewing a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708, fn. 2 (11th Cir. 2010). A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the plaintiff's claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1036 n.16. Specifically, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (citations omitted). Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation” is insufficient. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 1968-69 (citations omitted) (abrogating Conley, 355 U.S. 41 in part). Additionally, there is no longer a heightened pleading requirement. Randall, 610 F.3d at 701. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)).

         III. Applicable Law and Analysis

         A. Section 1983

         Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendants deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001). In addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.