FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit
Court for Polk County; Glenn T. Shelby, Judge.
Quintin Parks, pro se.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Quintin Parks appeals the order denying his motion to correct
illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse because the postconviction
court erroneously found that Parks' challenge to a
sentence beyond the maximum allowable for his offenses, which
was imposed as part of a negotiated plea agreement, could
only be brought under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
entered a negotiated plea to three counts of the lesser
offenses of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm,
first-degree felonies,  in exchange for concurrent sentences of
fifteen years' imprisonment with a ten-year mandatory
minimum followed by life probation. In his motion to correct
illegal sentence, he argued that by the addition of life
probation, his sentences exceeded the statutory maximum and
were illegal. See Clussman v. State, 89 So.3d 1093,
1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing for the striking of the
probationary terms of Clussman's sentences because when
they were added to her terms of imprisonment, her sentences
exceeded the statutory maximum). Parks correctly noted that a
sentence may be illegal even if a defendant agreed to it as
part of a negotiated plea. See McDuffie v. State,
946 So.2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("A trial court
cannot impose an illegal sentence even pursuant to a plea
bargain." (quoting Ferguson v. State, 804 So.2d
411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001))).
Dominguez v. State, 98 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012), and Nedd v. State, 855 So.2d 664, 665 (Fla.
2d DCA 2003), the postconviction court found that Parks'
motion was more properly considered under rule 3.850 because
Parks had to first move to withdraw his plea. The court then
denied the motion as time-barred under rule 3.850 because it
was filed over two years after Parks' judgment and
sentences became final. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(b). But Dominguez and Nedd are
distinguishable from the facts of this case; we write to
explain that distinction and, to the extent necessary, recede
entered a plea to a lesser charge-trafficking in fourteen to
twenty-eight grams of heroin-in exchange for a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment.
Nedd, 855 So.2d at 665. Nedd argued in his rule
3.800(a) motion that his sentence was illegal because this
court held the statute underlying his sentence
unconstitutional in Taylor v. State, 818 So.2d 544
(Fla. 2d DCA 2002). This court held that Nedd's motion
actually challeng[ed] the terms of a plea agreement and,
thus, the resulting convictions. Because a plea withdrawal is
a potential consequence in this case, Nedd must seek relief
under rule 3.850. In that proceeding, the State will have the
option to either agree to a resentencing or withdraw from the
plea agreement and proceed to trial on the original charges.
855 So.2d at 665 (citing Bruno v. State, 837 So.2d
521, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).
also entered a plea to a lesser offense-felony battery under
section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2009)-in exchange for a
sentence of five years' imprisonment as a prison releasee
reoffender (PRR). Dominguez, 98 So.3d at 200. He
subsequently filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, arguing that he
was illegally sentenced as a PRR because felony battery under
section 784.03(2), which reclassifies simple battery to a
third-degree felony upon a second battery conviction, did not
qualify for PRR sentencing. Noting that an illegal sentence
may not be imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, this court
followed Nedd and reversed and remanded for the
postconviction court to treat Dominguez's motion as if it
had been filed under rule 3.850. Id. at 200-01.
both Dominguez and Nedd, sufficient time
remained for the defendants to move to vacate ...