United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER [1]
SHERI
POLSTERCHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court upon review of the Motion to
Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants William Price,
Christopher Catron, Donald Sawyer, and Rebecca Jackson
(Doc. #31). Plaintiff did not file a response to the
Motion and the time to do so has long expired. See
Doc. #14 (warning Plaintiff that when a defendant
files a motion to dismiss, plaintiff shall have twenty-one
days to file a response). This matter is ripe for review.
I.
As
background, Plaintiff Kenyata Brown, who is civilly committed
at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”)
under Florida's Sexual Violent Predator's Act,
Florida Statute §§ 394.910-.913, initiated this
action as one of nineteen plaintiffs by filing a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 “sealed Class Action Complaint”
(Doc. #1). On January 28, 2016, the Court entered an
order (Doc. #2) dismissing the class action, without
prejudice, under section 1915 and declining to certify a
class. However, the Court allowed each plaintiff an
opportunity to file an Amended Complaint on or before
February 29, 2016.
Plaintiff
timely filed a motion for an enlargement of time, which the
Court granted. Plaintiff then timely filed an Amended
Complaint (Doc. #9). Prior to directing Plaintiff to
complete service of process forms, the Court reviewed
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under section 1915 and
entered an order of partial dismissal. In particular, the
Court dismissed one of the named defendants, Brian Masony,
because the Amended Complaint contained no factual
allegations whatsoever as to Masony, and the First Amendment
interference to access to court claim finding failure to
state a claim. Doc. #13.
Although
far from the model of clarity, the Amended Complaint
generally challenges Florida's Sexual Violent
Predator's Act, Florida Statute §§ 394.910-.913
(hereinafter “SVP Act”) and argues that the SVP
Act is unconstitutional and suggests ways the Florida
legislators could improve the SVP Act. Plaintiff also makes
vague and non-specific allegations regarding the treatment
provided to various “class members” at the FCCC
and avers that the named defendants are liable in their
individual capacities for adhering to the unconstitutional
statutes.
The
Amended Complaint alleges that Florida's SVP Act is
“not narrowly tailored” because:
(1) it “indisputably [fails] to require periodic risk
assessments”;
(2) it fails to provide a “judicial bypass
mechanism” to challenge his ongoing commitment;
(3) “the statutory discharge criteria is more stringent
than the statutory commitment criteria”;
(4) it authorizes “the burden to petition for a
reduction in custody to impermissibly shift from the
State” to Plaintiff;
(5) it requires civilly committed individuals to show by
clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive
alternative is appropriate; and
(6) it does not require the defendants to take any
affirmative action, such as petition for a reduction in
custody when the resident no longer satisfies the criteria
for continued commitment.
Amended
Complaint at 6-12. Plaintiff also urges that Florida's
SVP Act is unconstitutional as-applied because:
(7) Defendants Kanner, Zoley, Carroll, Sawyer, and Jackson do
not conduct periodic risk assessments of civilly committed
people at the FCCC;
(8) the risk assessments that have been performed since the
opening of the FCCC have not all been done in a
constitutional manner;
(9) Plaintiff has remained confined at the FCCC even though
he has completed treatment or sufficiently reduced his risk
of reoffending;
(10) discharge procedures are not working properly at FCCC;
(11) although the SVP Act expressly allows the referral of
committed individuals to less restrictive alternatives, this
is not occurring in practice;
(12) although treatment has been made available, the
treatment program's structure has been an institutional
failure and there is no meaningful relationship between the
treatment program and an end to indefinite detention;
(13) his due process rights were violated when the probable
cause hearing was held outside of his or his attorney's
presence; and
(14) Plaintiff's Equal Protection rights were violated
“because his liberty has been implicated as a result of
Fla. Stat. § 394 Part V being unconstitutional on its
face because the defendants use “the statute to
punishing and/or detain ‘Male' sex offenders after
completion of their prison sentence and not applying [sic]
the same standard to ‘Female' sex offenders for
their past and present sexual violent
offenses.”[2]
Id. at 17-28. In a requested relief section seven
pages in length, Plaintiff requests in pertinent part that
“substantial changes be made to Florida's sex
offender civil commitment scheme, ” and two million
dollars in ...