final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lower
Tribunal No. 15-4466 Amy Steele Donner, Judge.
Carlyle Appellate Law Firm and Christopher V. Carlyle (The
Villages), for appellant.
Perez Matos Law Firm and Cecilia Perez-Matos (Delray Beach),
LOGUE, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.
See Russell v. Pasik, 178 So.3d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA
and LUCK, JJ., concur.
case involves an area of law - regarding how advances in
reproductive technology impact the definition of the modern
family - which is struggling to catch up with and reflect the
rapid changes taking place in society. In this case, a
same-sex couple arranged to have a child together. When the
couple separated, the birth mother blocked all contact
between the child and the former partner. The former partner
filed a petition in the lower court to establish her parental
rights regarding the child, including visitation. The case
presents the issue of whether the birth mother's
constitutional right to privacy protects her decision to
sever the child's ties with her former partner when the
former partner is not the biological or legal parent of the
reviewing a motion to dismiss, the truth of the allegations
are assumed. See Xavier v. Leviev Boymelgreen Marquis
Developers, LLC, 117 So.3d 773, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
("In ruling on a motion to dismiss, all well-pled facts
in the complaint are accepted as true . . . ."). The
Appellant, Vivian de los Milagros Castellat, filed the
petition in the court below seeking to establish parental
rights. For ten years she was the domestic partner of the
Appellee, Gisela Lissette Pereira, the birth mother of the
child who was the subject of the petition. During that time,
the parties presented themselves as a married couple, but
never actually wed. Ms. De los Milagros Castellat, whom we
will refer to as the "former partner, " and the
birth mother utilized assisted reproductive technology to
have a child. They agreed Pereira, the Appellee, would be the
2009, the birth mother gave birth to twins: a boy and a girl
who were born prematurely. The boy survived only two days.
The girl lived but continued to have special needs. Both
children were given the former partner's surname, but the
birth mother alone was listed as the mother on the birth
parties raised the child together for approximately four
years. The parties and the child celebrated holidays
together. Both the birth mother and the former partner took
the child to her many doctor appointments, which included
physical therapy, speech therapy, and occupational therapy.
For the duration of their time together with the child, the
parties lived in a home that was jointly owned by the birth
mother and the former partner. The parties twice ...