FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Robert A.
L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Anthony C. Musto, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dawn A. Tiffin,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
appeals the disposition order finding him guilty of
third-degree grand theft. We agree with the State's
concession that the trial court conducted an inadequate
Richardson hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the order
finding Z.L. guilty and remand for a new adjudicatory
accused of having taken a Nintendo game system, five games,
and a protective case for the Nintendo from his step-brother.
On the morning of the adjudicatory hearing, the victim
informed the prosecutor that Z.L. had previously admitted to
him that he committed the theft. The prosecutor chose not to
disclose the admission to the defense under the mistaken
belief that Z.L. had waived disclosure by not deposing the
victim. See Powell v. State, 912 So.2d 698, 701
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("[T]he failure of the defense to
depose a known witness 'is insufficient to overcome the
state's failure to inform the defense of a statement made
by the defendant to which the witness testifies.'
'' (quoting Rainey v. State, 596 So.2d 1295,
1296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992))).
the victim testified about the admission, Z.L. correctly
argued to the trial court that the State had committed a
discovery violation by not disclosing the statement. See
State v. Evans, 770 So.2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 2000)
("In cases . . . where the State fails to disclose to
the defendant, prior to trial, the substance of any oral
statement allegedly made by the defendant, then the State has
committed a discovery violation and the trial court must
conduct a Richardson hearing upon learning of the
possible violation."); see also Fla. R. Juv. P.
8.060(h) (imposing a continuing duty to provide supplemental
addressing the potential violation, the trial court did not
make the findings that Richardson requires. See
Knight v. State, 76 So.3d 879, 888 (Fla. 2011)
(explaining that when a party alleges a discovery violation,
the trial court must inquire into the surrounding
circumstances and determine (1) whether a discovery violation
occurred, (2) "whether the State's discovery
violation was inadvertent or willful, " (3)
"whether the violation was trivial or substantial,
" and (4) "most importantly, what affect [sic] it
had on the defendant's ability to prepare for
trial"). The court instead examined only one of the
Richardson prongs-whether the violation was
inadvertent or willful- and concluded, "to the extent
that there's any violation, it was inadvertent." The
court's failure to inquire into each of the
Richardson prongs was error.
that error was harmful. We cannot say "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally
prejudiced by the discovery violation, " as "there
is a reasonable possibility that [Z.L.'s] trial
preparation or strategy would have been materially
different" had he known that the State possessed an
admission to the offense. Scipio v. State, 928 So.2d
1138, 1147 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. Schopp, 653
So.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Fla. 1995)). The court's inadequate
Richardson hearing therefore necessitates a new
adjudicatory hearing. See Ibarra v. State, 56 So.3d
70, 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
we reverse the order finding Z.L. guilty of third-degree
grand theft and remand for a new adjudicatory hearing on that
CASANUEVA, CRENSHAW, and ...