FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Timothy R. Shea,
S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ailene S. Rogers, Assistant
Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A.
Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Barnes, a juvenile at the time of the relevant crimes,
appeals his judgments and sentences for second-degree murder
and robbery with a firearm. We affirm as to all issues, but
write to address Barnes's claim that the trial court
erred in considering convictions for crimes committed
subsequent to the crimes in this case to support its decision
to impose a life sentence and to correct a scrivener's
error in the amended sentencing documents.
Barnes was a juvenile at the time he committed these
offenses, the trial court conducted an individualized
sentencing hearing pursuant to section 921.1401, Florida
Statutes (2016). At the sentencing hearing, the State filed
copies of judgments and sentences in three other cases for
crimes that Barnes committed after he committed the crimes in
this case. The State conceded that the subsequent
convictions could not be scored on the Criminal Punishment
Code scoresheet, but argued that the court could consider
them in determining whether a life sentence was appropriate.
The trial court considered the subsequent convictions and
sentenced Barnes to life in prison for the second-degree
murder and thirty-five years in prison for robbery. The court
found that Barnes was entitled to a judicial review on both
convictions after twenty-five years and that the
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum applied to both
to filing his initial brief, Barnes filed a motion to correct
sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(b)(2), arguing that the trial court erred in
relying on his subsequent convictions in support of the life
sentence and in determining that he was entitled to a
judicial review of his thirty-five-year sentence for the
robbery conviction after twenty-five years, instead of twenty
years under section 947.1402(2)(d). In a written order, the
trial court concluded that it properly considered
Barnes's subsequent convictions at the individualized
sentencing hearing under the juvenile sentencing statutes,
but agreed that Barnes was entitled to a review of the
thirty-five-year sentence after twenty years.
is correct that, under the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial
court may not consider a subsequent arrest without
conviction during sentencing for the primary offense.
Norvil v. State, 191 So.3d 406, 410 (Fla. 2016). But
Barnes's reliance on Norvil is misplaced. Barnes
is a juvenile offender and subject to the new statutes
enacted for sentencing juveniles convicted as adults. These
statutes allow the trial court to consider the juvenile
offender's "youth and its attendant characteristics,
" including the juvenile's immaturity, lack of
judgment, and possibility of rehabilitation in determining
whether to impose a life sentence. § 921.1401(2), Fla.
Stat. (2014). At a minimum, Barnes's subsequent criminal
behavior with convictions is relevant to the
possibility of his rehabilitation. Id. §
921.1401(2)(j). His subsequent criminal behavior is equally
relevant to help the trial court determine his
"immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks
and consequences" in participating in the offense and
"[t]he effect, if any, of characteristics attributable
to the defendant's youth on the defendant's
judgment." Id. § 921.1401(2)(e), (i).
Simply put, his subsequent arrests with convictions
may help the sentencing court determine whether Barnes was a
juvenile offender whose crimes reflect "transient
immaturity, " thereby warranting a lesser sentence, or
that "rare" juvenile offender whose crimes reflect
"irreparable corruption, " thereby warranting a
life sentence. See Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393,
397 (Fla. 2015) (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 479-80 (2012)).
we agree, and the State concedes, that the amended sentencing
documents contain a scrivener's error as to the judicial
review period for count two, which should be corrected to
conform to the trial court's written order granting
Barnes's rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. We remand the case to
the trial court to correct the scrivener's error on the
amended sentencing documents dated January 26, 2017. See
Taylor v. State, 120 So.3d 213, 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).
Barnes need not be present for entry of the corrected
and REMANDED with instructions.
CJ and BERGER, J, concur