United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(“petition”) (Dkt. 1), Respondent's
supplemental response (Dkt. 27), and Petitioner's
supplemental reply (Dkt.29). Upon consideration, the petition
will be DENIED.
was charged by Amended Information with nine drug-related
charges (Counts 1 and 3-10), felonious possession of firearms
(Count 2), and fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer
(Count 11) (Respondent's Ex. 1). On March 10, 2008,
Counts 2 and 11 were severed from the remaining counts
(Respondent's Ex. 11d, p. 11). After a jury trial on
March 11, 2008, Petitioner was found guilty on Counts 1 and
4-10, and guilty of a lesser included offense on Count 3
(Respondent's Ex. 2). That same day he pleaded guilty to
Count 2 (Respondent's Ex. 11). On May 20, 2008, Petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw the plea (Respondent's Ex.
11A), which was denied on October 7, 2008 (Respondent's
22, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years on Counts 1
and 8, 10 years on Counts 4, 6, and 9, and 5 years on Counts
3, 5, 7, and 10 (Respondent's Ex. 3). He filed an Amended
Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2008 (Respondent's Ex.
4). On October 22, 2008, he was sentenced to15 years on Count
2 (Respondent's Ex. 11C). He did not file a notice of
appeal with respect to Count 2. His trial based convictions
and sentences were affirmed on appeal on November 10, 2010
(Respondent's Ex. 9). On November 17, 2010, Petitioner
provided a Motion for Rehearing of the appellate court's
decision to prison officials for mailing (Respondent's
Ex. 8). That motion was received by the Florida Attorney
General's Office on November 22, 2010 (Id., p.
1). The motion, however, does not appear on the appellate
court's docket (Respondent's Ex. 7). The appellate
court mandate issued December 6, 2010 (Respondent's Ex.
November 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for
post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Respondent's Ex. 11D). That motion
was denied in part and dismissed in part on September 9, 2011
(Id.; Respondent's Ex. 30). Petitioner did not
appeal the denial of that motion.
November 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for
post-conviction relief under Rule 3.800, Fla.R.Crim.P.
(Respondent's Ex. 12). That motion was denied
(Respondent's Ex. 13) and affirmed on appeal
(Respondent's Ex. 18). The appellate court mandate issued
October 4, 2012 (Respondent's Ex. 18A).
13, 2012, Petitioner filed a second Rule 3.850 motion
(Respondent's Exs. 11D; 29). The motion was denied on
August 2, 2012 (Respondent's Ex. 29). Petitioner did not
appeal the denial of that motion.
December 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a third Rule 3.850 motion
(Respondent's Exs. 11D; 19). The motion was dismissed as
successive (Respondent's Ex. 19). The dismissal of that
motion was affirmed (Respondent's Ex. 23), and the
appellate court mandate issued on March 27, 2014
(Respondent's Ex. 26).
January 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel (Respondent's Ex. 27). The petition was dismissed
as untimely on February 12, 2013 (Respondent's Ex. 28).
filed his federal habeas petition in this court on May 2,
2014 (Dkt. 1). Respondent filed a limited response arguing
that the petition was time-barred (Dkt. 17). The court
granted the motion to dismiss solely to the extent that
Ground One of the petition was dismissed as time-barred, and
directed Respondent to file a supplemental response
addressing Grounds Two, Three, and Four of the petition (Dkt.
26). Respondent filed a supplemental response (Dkt. 27), to
which Petitioner replied (Dkt. 29).
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d
880, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA “establishes a
more deferential standard of review of state habeas
judgments, ” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206,
1215 (11th Cir. 2001), in order to “prevent federal
habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under
law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002);
see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24
(2002) (recognizing that the federal habeas court's
evaluation of state-court rulings is highly deferential and
that state-court decisions must be given the benefit of the
Standard of Review Under the AEDPA
Pursuant to the AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with
respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly
established Federal law, ” encompasses only the
holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412
2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state
court decisions; the ‘contrary to' and
‘unreasonable application' clauses articulate
independent considerations a federal court must
consider.” Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't. of
Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning
of the clauses was ...