United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
C. RICHARDSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's appeal
of an administrative decision denying her application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). Plaintiff claims that she became
disabled on February 2, 2010. (Tr. 17, 155-60.) The
application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
17, 84-124.) A hearing was held in front of an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) on August 18, 2014. (Tr.
44-83.) The ALJ rendered a decision on February 25, 2015,
finding Plaintiff not disabled from February 2, 2010, the
alleged onset date, through the date of the
is appealing the Commissioner's decision that she was not
disabled from February 2, 2010 through February 25, 2015.
Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies
and the case is properly before the Court. The Court has
reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For
the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
scope of this Court's review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards,
McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.
1988), and whether the Commissioner's findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where
the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the
reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of
fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner's decision.
Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358
(11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence
as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v.
Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating
the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the
reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual findings).
argues three general points on appeal. First, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of her
treating physician, Judella Haddad, M.D., consultative
examining doctor Richard Nay, Ph.D, her former employer, Lynn
Martin, Esq., and her husband, Richard Williams. Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ failed to articulate good cause
supported by substantial evidence for discounting their
opinions. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
evaluating Plaintiff's migraine headaches. Third,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her
credibility by failing to take into consideration her strong
work history. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ's
evaluation of the opinions of record is clearly articulated
and supported by substantial evidence, that the ALJ properly
considered Plaintiff's migraines, and that the ALJ fairly
evaluated Plaintiff's credibility. The undersigned agrees
with Plaintiff with respect to her first contention and thus
determines that remand is warranted without addressing the
second and third issues raised on appeal.
Standard for Evaluating Opinion Evidence
is required to consider all the evidence in the record when
making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(3). With regard to medical opinion
evidence, “the ALJ must state with particularity the
weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Substantial
weight must be given to a treating physician's opinion
unless there is good cause to do otherwise. See Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
cause' exists when the: (1) treating physician's
opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's
own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). When a treating
physician's opinion does not warrant controlling weight,
the ALJ must nevertheless weigh the medical opinion based on:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination, (2) the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, (3) the medical evidence supporting
the opinion, (4) consistency of the medical opinion with the
record as a whole, (5) specialization in the medical issues
at issue, and (6) any other factors that tend to support or
contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to
more weight than a consulting physician's opinion,
see Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir.
1984) (per curiam); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2),
“[t]he opinions of state agency physicians” can
outweigh the contrary opinion of a treating physician if
“that opinion has been properly discounted, ”
Cooper v. Astrue, No. 8:06-cv-1863-T-27TGW, 2008 WL
649244, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008). Further, “the
ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a
contrary finding.” Wainwright v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 06-15638, 2007 WL 708971, at *2 (11th
Cir. Mar. 9, 2007) (per curiam); see also Sryock v.
Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
from other sources, e.g., not acceptable medical
sources such as nurse-practitioners, may be used to show the
severity of a claimant's impairments and how it affects
the claimant's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1513(d); SSR 06-03p. “Since there is a requirement
to consider all relevant evidence in an individual's case
record, the case record should reflect the consideration of
opinions from medical sources who are not ‘acceptable
medical sources' and from ‘non-medical sources'
who have seen the claimant in their professional
capacity.” SSR 06-03p.
The weight to which such evidence may be entitled will vary
according to the particular facts of the case, the source of
the opinion, including that source's qualifications, the
issue(s) that the opinion is about, and many other factors .
. . . However, depending on the particular facts in a case,
and after applying the factors for weighing opinion evidence,
an opinion from a medical source who is not an
“acceptable medical source” may outweigh the
opinion of an “acceptable medical source, ”
including the medical opinion of a treating source.
Id.; see also Duncan v. Astrue, No.
3:07-cv-751-J-HTS, 2008 WL 1925091, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29,
2008) (citing SSR 06-03p); Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d