final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No.
A. Silverman and Michael R. Kassower of Frank, Weinberg &
Black, P.L., Plantation, for appellant.
Perlman of Mark Perlman, P.A., Hallandale Beach, for
appellee, Edge Pilates Corporation, a Florida corporation.
F. Phillips, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee, Bayou Meto, Inc.,
a Florida corporation.
case has been before this court on numerous occasions. This
is the third time the case is being reversed and remanded for
underlying facts are fully set forth in Tribeca Aesthetic
Medical Solutions, LLC v. Edge Pilates Corp., 82 So.3d
899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and Edge Pilates Corp. v.
Tribeca Aesthetic Medical Solutions, LLC, 162 So.3d 246
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (Tribeca I and Tribeca
II). In short, Bayou Meto (the Landlord) leased a
building to Edge Pilates (the Tenant), and Edge Pilates
subleased a portion of the premises to Tribeca (the
Subtenant). Under the agreement between the Tenant and the
Subtenant, an unspecified portion of the rent was for
marketing services to be provided by the Tenant.
dispute arose when the Tenant vacated the premises before the
expiration of its lease. The Subtenant claimed that its
business was dependent on the traffic generated by the Tenant
and refused to pay rent on the theory that the Tenant failed
to provide marketing services as required by the lease.
Tenant sued the Subtenant for eviction and money damages and
the Subtenant counterclaimed for unjust enrichment. As
required by section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2010), the
Subtenant paid the monthly rent into the court registry for
the duration of the term of the lease. This deposit
included the amount which the Subtenant claimed was earmarked
for marketing services.
Landlord intervened asserting its entitlement to the
"rent" in the court registry. In Tribeca
I, this court held that the Landlord's right to the
registry funds was subordinate to the main action.
Tribeca I, 82 So.3d at 901. However, because the
Subtenant was still in possession of a portion of the
premises, this court held that the Landlord may be entitled
to disbursement under section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes
(allowing disbursement where a landlord is in danger of
losing the premises or suffering other hardship resulting
from loss of rental income from the premises). Id.
remand, the Landlord returned some of the disbursed funds to
the registry and began to receive hardship payments under
section 83.232(1). The Tenant and the Subtenant proceeded to
the non-jury trial which resulted in the Tribeca II
appeal. In Tribeca II, this court found that the
Tenant had established its cause of action for eviction and
the Subtenant had established its cause of action for unjust
enrichment. This court found the damage award of $100, 000 to
the Subtenant was not supported by competent, substantial
evidence, and remanded "for the purpose of conducting an
evidentiary hearing to determine the apportionment of rent
monies between the value of the property and the value of the
marketing services." Tribeca II¸ 162
So.3d at 250.
remand, the Landlord again claimed entitlement to the rent in
the registry. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court determined that the Tenant owed the Landlord $143,
023.60 in unpaid rent and ordered the clerk of court to
disburse that amount from the registry directly to the
Landlord. The court found that the money in the
registry "has been rent" and that any issue
remaining in the case between the Tenant and the Subtenant
should not delay "the Intervenor/Landlord's
entitlement to the rent in the court registry at this
time." The Subtenant appeals.
that the trial court did not err in finding that the funds in
the registry represent "rent" ― the error was
in finding that the funds, in the first instance, represented
rent owed to the Landlord. In fact, the funds
consisted of disputed rental payments to be allocated between
the Tenant and the Subtenant. Tribeca II, 162 So.3d
at 250. During the pendency of this case, the ...