United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
TRISHA FLOYD and CHRISTOPHER FLOYD, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor child S.F. Plaintiffs,
THE CITY OF SANIBEL, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of
Sanibel's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying
Summary Judgment (Doc. 121) filed on October 25,
2017. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the
case stems from mold found in the Plaintiffs Trisha Floyd,
Christopher Floyd, and their minor child S.F.'s
apartment. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a multi-count
complaint against the City of Sanibel, Community Housing
Resources, Inc. (“CHR”), and Kelly Collini.
(Doc. 7). On April 11, 2016, Plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed CHR and Kelly Collini pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. 47). Of note, the
Plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice against
“only” CHR and Collini.
than a year later, the City moved for summary judgment
against Plaintiffs. (Doc. 86). Ultimately, the Court
denied the motion because questions of fact existed.
(Doc. 104). Then the Court dismissed CHR and Collini
with prejudice in accordance with Plaintiffs' voluntary
dismissal on October 4, 2017. (Doc. 111). Now, the
City moves for reconsideration of the Court's denial of
its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 121).
justify reconsideration, courts generally look to three
grounds: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need
to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Cazorla
Salinas v. Weinkle, 14-CV-62481, 2015 WL 11198008, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2015). But “[a] motion for
reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Wilchombe
v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir.
2009). “Denial of a motion for reconsideration is
especially sound when the party has failed to articulate any
reason for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier stage
in the litigation.” Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of
Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Ultimately, reconsideration
of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be used
sparingly. See Schwarz v. Villages Charter Sch.,
Inc., 5:12-CV-177-OC-34PRL, 2015 WL 12856106, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2015).
first time-the City argues that it cannot be held vicariously
liable for the acts of its purported agent, CHR, because CHR
was dismissed from the action, and therefore Plaintiffs
vicarious liability claims against City are extinguished.
(Doc. 121). As stated, a motion for reconsideration
is not the appropriate vehicle to raise new arguments.
See Wilchombe, 555 F.3d at 957. And this
argument did not suddenly became available after the Court
decided the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact,
this argument was available as early as April 11, 2016 when
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed CHR and Collini. (Doc.
47). Because a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal
is effective upon filing and requires no further action by
the court, the Court's later order dismissing CHR and
Collini had no impact on the availability of the City's
argument. See Anago Fran., Inc. v. Shaz,
LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (“We
have found that notices of dismissal allowed for under Rule
41 (a)(1)(A)(i) are effective upon filing.”) In other
words, the basis for City's argument materialized in
early 2016 but was not raised until more than a
year-and-a-half later. Since this argument was available
before the City moved for summary judgment, the Court will
not address it on a motion for reconsideration.
it is now ORDERED:
Defendant City of Sanibel's Motion for Reconsideration of
Order Denying Summary Judgment (Doc. 121) is