final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Matthew I. Destry, Judge; L.T. Case No.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale
Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Haughwout, Public Defender, and J. Woodson Isom, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
an inmate at a correctional facility was disciplined for
violating the inmate code of conduct by attacking a
corrections officer, the state charged him with battery on a
law enforcement officer. The inmate moved to dismiss the
information, arguing that the criminal charge was precluded
by double jeopardy principles. The trial court granted the
motion and the state appeals. Because we find that the Double
Jeopardy Clause was never meant to impinge on remedial
institutional discipline, we reverse the trial court's
order of dismissal.
motion to dismiss, the appellant, Franklin Jones, argued that
the prosecution was barred because the Broward Sheriff's
Office imposed what amounted to a criminal sanction for his
bad behavior. During the hearing, he introduced into evidence
the Broward Sheriff's Office Department of Detention and
Community Control Inmate Handbook ("the handbook"),
which contains a code of conduct for inmates. The code of
conduct provides that the commission of specified Category A
offenses could result in "thirty . . . days of
disciplinary segregation, up to thirty . . . days of room
restriction, and/or loss of partial or all earned gain time .
. . ." Jones also introduced a "Disciplinary
Committee Action Sheet" ("the disciplinary
report"), which reflects that Jones was found guilty of
assault, fighting, and disruptive conduct, all Category A
infractions. The disciplinary report also reflects that Jones
received thirty days of "Disciplinary Detention, "
but that he did not lose any gain time.
argued that the potential sanctions provided for in the code
of conduct amounted to criminal penalties. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss based on a finding that the
potential of revocation of gain time had no purpose other
than punishment and was thus a criminal penalty and a
violation of double jeopardy.
parties do not dispute the facts underlying this purely legal
issue. Thus, our review is de novo. Binns v. State,
979 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). "The federal and
Florida constitutions prohibit being twice placed in jeopardy
for the same offense." Hall v. State, 823 So.2d
757, 761 (Fla. 2002), abrogation on other grounds
recognized in State v. Johnson, 122 So.3d 856, 862 (Fla.
2013); see also Amend. V, U.S. Const.; Art. I,
§ 9, Fla. Const. This constitutional protection
encompasses "multiple punishments for the same
offense." U.S. v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1219
(11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "The scope of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the federal
constitution and the Florida Constitution."
Hall, 823 So.2d at 761.
United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the process of
determining whether double jeopardy is implicated by the
imposition of both judicial and administrative penalties:
We have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that
could, '"in common parlance, '" be
described as punishment. United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549, 63 S.Ct. 379, 387, 87 L.Ed. 443
(1943) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19,
14 L.Ed. 306 (1852)). The Clause protects only against the
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938); see also
Hess, supra, at 548-549, 63 S.Ct., at
386-387 ("Only" "criminal punishment"
"subject[s] the defendant to 'jeopardy' within
the constitutional mean-ing"); Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975)
("In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the
risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal
prosecution"), and then only when such occurs in
successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).
Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at
least initially, a matter of statutory construction.
Helvering, supra, at 399, 58 S.Ct., at 633.
A court must first ask whether the legislature, "in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either
expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the
other." Ward, 448 U.S., at 248, 100 S.Ct., at
2641. Even in those cases where the legislature "has
indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have
inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect, " id., at 248-249,
100 S.Ct., at 2641, as to "transfor[m] what was clearly
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, "
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154,
76 S.Ct. 219, 222, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956).
In making this latter determination, the factors listed in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169,
83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), provide useful
guideposts, including: (1) "[w]hether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5)
"whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned." It is
important to note, however, that "these factors must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face, "
id., at 169, 83 S.Ct., at 568, and "only the
clearest proof" will suffice to override legislative