United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
SHERIPOLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Karen
Blankenship's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Civil
Rights Complaint (Doc. #25) filed on March 6, 2017. Plaintiff
Franklin Monfiston filed his Response in Opposition (Doc.
#32) on March 30, 2017. The Motion to Dismiss is fully
briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
initiated this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging Defendant Blankenship violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by failing to treat his fractured forearm and
dislocated wrist. On July 19, 2015, Monfiston was working in
the prison law library when he fell and fractured his right
arm and separated his right wrist. (Doc. #1 at 4). Due to the
medical emergency Monfiston was allowed to go to the medical
center for treatment. Monfiston was originally seen by Nurse
S.E. Pugh. Nurse Pugh treated Monfiston with an ace bandage
to wrap the arm and Ibuprofan for pain.
returned to the medical center the next day and was seen by
Nurse Blankenship. Nurse Blankenship diagnosed Monfiston with
a fractured right arm and separated wrist. Nurse Blankenship
informed Monfiston that it was okay to wear the ace bandage
he was given the day before as long as it was loosely
wrapped, prescribed 500 milligrams of Naproxen for fourteen
days, and ordered x-rays for the arm. (Doc. #1 at 5-6).
Monfiston requested a sling and splint for his arm, however,
Nurse Blankenship informed him that none were available.
(Doc. #1 at 6). Nurse Blankenship had no further contact with
Monfiston after treating him on July 20, 2017.
deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all
factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Christopher v
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d
413 (2002). However, dismissal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted does not require appearance,
beyond a doubt. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 561- 563, S.Ct. 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007) (aboragating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the “grounds” of his
“entitlement” to relief requires more than
labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the cause
of actions elements. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. 544,
satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, a
complaint must simply give the defendants fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests. Id. at 555; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1
(2002). Although the pleading standard announced in Fed R.
Civ. P. 8 does not require “detailed factual
allegations, ” it does demand more than an unadorned,
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268
(11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ascroft v. Iqbal, __
U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
Furthermore, unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint
are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of the allegations. Sinaltrainal, 578
F.3d at 1268 (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). The
facts as pled must state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (citing
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). Dismissal is warranted
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the
factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint, there is a
dispositive legal issue which precludes relief.
Simplexgrinnell, L.P. v. Ghiran, 2007 WL 2480352
(M.D. Fla. August 29, 2007) (citing Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d
338 (1989); Brown v. Crawford County, Georgia, 960
F.2d 1002, 1009-1010 (11th Cir. 1992).
now moves the Court to dismiss Monfiston's Complaint
because he fails to state a claim against her.
Monfiston's Complaint alleges that Blankenship violated
his Eighth Amendment right by subjecting him to cruel and
unusual punishment by failing to treat his fractured forearm
and dislocated right wrist.
order to state a claim for a violation under the Eighth
Amendment, a plaintiff-prisoner must allege “acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251
(1976); see also Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9,
112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (opining that a
prisoner must demonstrate a “serious” medical
need “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners
will have unqualified access to health care....”). This
showing requires a plaintiff to satisfy both an objective and
a subjective inquiry. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1243 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Taylor v. Adams, 221
F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.2000)). First, a plaintiff must
show that he had an “objectively serious medical
need.” Id. “A serious medical need is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.” Id. (citations omitted).
“The medical need must be one that, if left unattended,
pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Id. Second, a plaintiff must establish that a
defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” by
showing both a: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm (i.e., both awareness of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists
and the actual drawing of the inference); (2) disregard of
that risk; and (3) conduct that is more than gross
negligence. Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272
purposes of this Motion, Blankenship concedes that
Monfiston's injury was a serious medical need. However,
Blankenship argues that she was not deliberately indifferent
to Monfiston's medical needs.
treatment of Monfiston's broken arm did not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference. For medical treatment to
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care
must be “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to
fundamental fairness.” Palazon v. Sec'y for
Dep't of Corr., 361 Fed.Appx. 88, 89 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). A medical need may
be considered serious if a delay in treating it makes it
worse. Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th
Cir.2008). To show deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
defendants' response to the need was more than
“merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis
or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under
state law.” Palazon, 361 Fed.Appx. at 89
(quoting Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th
Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
did not delay in treating Monfiston, nor disregard the risk
to his arm. Instead, Blankenship prescribed 500 milligrams of
Naproxen for fourteen days for his pain, and ordered x-rays
for the arm, and instructed him how to use the ace bandage
given him the day before. (Doc. #1 at 5-6). Blankenship's
treatment was not grossly incompetent, inadequate, so
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be ...