United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court pursuant to the United States
of America's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #
43), filed on November 8, 2017. Pro se Defendant Steven J.
Kaniadakis responded on November 21, 2017. (Doc. # 45). For
the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
a student at the Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine,
[Kaniadakis] applied for and [was] granted Health Education
Assistance Loans (HEAL)” made by a private lender.
(Doc. # 43-2 at 1). Kaniadakis “consolidated [his] HEAL
loans into one HEAL Relief Account loan in the amount of
$146, 575.13” and “signed a promissory note on
February 25, 1995, agreeing to repay the loan at a variable
rate of interest.” (Id.; Doc. # 43-1 at 3-5).
“Between October 23, 1995, and February 4, 1997,
[Kaniadakis] made sixteen  payments totaling $11,
633.75.” (Doc. # 43-2 at 1).
September 12, 1997, Kaniadakis filed for bankruptcy in the
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Alaska.
(Id.). The majority of Kaniadakis's debts were
“discharged on June 22, 1998, however,
[Kaniadakis's] HEAL debt was not dischargeable under
bankruptcy.” (Id.). Due to the bankruptcy, the
promissory note was assigned from the private lender to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on October 7,
1997. (Id.). HHS informed Kaniadakis that it was the
current holder of the note by letter dated October 7, 1997.
(Id.). Despite numerous attempts by HHS to establish
a repayment schedule with Kaniadakis, a repayment schedule
was not set and no further payments were made. (Id.
26, 2017, the United States initiated this default of student
loan action against Kaniadakis. (Doc. # 1). According to the
Complaint, Kaniadakis is indebted to the United States in the
total amount of $443, 170.01 for the principal and interest
accrued for the consolidated student loan. (Id. at
1-2; Doc. # 1-2). Kaniadakis filed a motion to dismiss the
Complaint on June 27, 2017, (Doc. # 11), which the Court
denied on July 13, 2017. (Doc. # 15). Subsequently,
Kaniadakis filed his Answer on July 31, 2017. (Doc. # 17).
29, 2017, the Court entered its Case Management and
Scheduling Order (Doc. # 12), setting a discovery deadline of
August 28, 2017. But Kaniadakis moved to extend the discovery
period by sixty days on August 17, 2017, arguing that further
discovery was necessary regarding his payment history. (Doc.
# 21). After the United States indicated that it did not
oppose the requested extension (Doc. # 23), the Court granted
Kaniadakis's motion, extended the discovery deadline to
October 27, 2017, and entered an Amended Case Management and
Scheduling Order. (Doc. ## 24, 25).
on September 15, 2017, the United States filed its first
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 30). Kaniadakis then
filed numerous motions to compel discovery and responded to
the Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the Motion was
premature because discovery was still underway. (Doc. ## 31,
32, 35). The Court denied the United States' first Motion
for Summary Judgment without prejudice on September 27, 2017,
after finding that the Motion was premature. (Doc. # 36). The
Magistrate Judge granted Kaniadakis's Second Motion to
Compel on October 24, 2017 (Doc. # 41), and the United States
subsequently filed a notice of compliance indicating that it
had provided the requested to discovery to Kaniadakis. (Doc.
after the discovery period has ended, the United States has
filed its renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 43).
Kaniadakis responded in opposition on November 21, 2017.
(Doc. # 45). The Motion is ripe for review.
Judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a
grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739,
742 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun
Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A
fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears
the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to
materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of
material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson
Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then
‘go beyond the pleadings, ' and by its own
affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, ' designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc.,
64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324).
there is a conflict between the parties' allegations or
evidence, the non-moving party's evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party's favor. Shotz v. City of
Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).
If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could
draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that
inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, the
court should not grant summary judgment. Samples ex rel.
Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th
Cir. 1988) (citing Augusta Iron & Steel Works, Inc.
v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th
Cir. 1988)). However, if the non-movant's response
consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations, ” summary judgment is not
only proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d
1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1981).