Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Khan v. Tahir

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

November 30, 2017

SOHAIL AKBAR KHAN, Plaintiff,
v.
IRUM TAHIR and MALIK TAHIR ASLAM, Defendants.

          ORDER

          VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants Irum Tahir and Malik Tahir Aslam's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. # 9), filed on November 15, 2017. Plaintiff Sohail Akbar Khan responded on November 29, 2017. (Doc. # 12). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

         I. Background

         Khan, a resident of Pakistan, alleges that his late wife, Nazia, fell ill and required a lung transplant to survive. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 4-5, 10-11). In 2015, Khan arranged for his wife to travel to Tampa, Florida, to be treated and hopefully receive a transplant at a hospital there. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). To pay for Nazia's treatment in advance, Khan transferred $600, 000 - the cost quoted for the anticipated transplant and subsequent care - from his personal bank account to the hospital's bank account. (Id. at ¶ 16).

         While on the waiting list for a lung transplant, Nazia stayed with Defendants, her sister and brother-in-law, who live in Tampa. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 14-15). Defendants allegedly committed “fraudulent acts” during this time, including convincing the ill Nazia to withdraw the $600, 000 from the hospital's account. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-25). Nazia transferred the money to a new “joint/payable upon death” account shared with Defendants, such that Defendants would gain title to the money upon Nazia's death. (Id.).

         Nazia subsequently passed away in January of 2017 without having received a transplant. (Id. at ¶ 26). Defendants allegedly falsified Nazia's death certificate to state that she was divorced, even though she was legally married to Khan at the time of her death. (Id. at ¶ 28). Despite Khan's requests, Defendants have allegedly refused to return the money and have used it for their personal benefit. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-31).

         Khan filed his Complaint on October 17, 2017, asserting claims for civil theft, unjust enrichment, conversion, and civil conspiracy against both Defendants, as well as a claim for aiding and abetting fraud against Aslam. (Doc. # 1). Defendants have moved to dismiss (Doc. # 9), and Khan has responded in opposition (Doc. # 12). The Motion is ripe for review.

         II. Legal Standard

         On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)(stating “[o]n a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as true”).

         However:

[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.

Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he scope of review must be limited to the four corners of the complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

         Additionally, motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may attack jurisdiction facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). “‘Facial attacks' on the complaint ‘require[ ] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.'” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)(citation omitted).

         III. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.