United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Claude
Letourneau's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. ,
Plaintiff Cindy Lynn Thibault's Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No.  (collectively “Plaintiffs'
Motions for Summary Judgment”), and Defendant Melodie
Carpio's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 
(“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment”).
The Court has carefully considered all Motions, all
supporting and opposing filings, the relevant authorities,
and is otherwise duly advised. For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts
Claude Letourneau (“Mr. Letourneau”) and Cindy
Lynn Thibault (“Ms. Thibault”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) sued Melodie Carpio
(“Defendant”) for violating the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-2725 (“DPPA”). See ECF No. .
did not dispute Plaintiffs' respective Statements of
Undisputed Material Facts filed in support of their Motions
for Summary Judgment. Local Rule 56.1(b) provides that
“[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's
statement filed and supported as required above will be
deemed admitted unless controverted by the opposing
party's statement, provided that the Court finds that the
movant's statement is supported by evidence in the
record.” See S.D. Fla. L.R. 56.1(b). To the
extent that record evidence supports Plaintiffs'
Statements of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF Nos.  and
, these facts are deemed admitted and undisputed as set
16, 2016, Pembroke Pines Police Department Sergeant Scott
Carris randomly audited several police officers' use of
the Driver and Vehicle Information Database
(“DAVID”). See ECF Nos.  at  at
¶ 1. Defendant was one of the names selected
for review as part of the audit. Id. at ¶ 2.
Sergeant Carris ultimately determined that Defendant
improperly accessed Mr. Letourneau's information on the
DAVID database 82 times and Ms. Thibault's information 85
times. Id. at ¶ 3. Thereafter, on September 16,
2016, Defendant, under oath and with her attorney present,
voluntarily answered Sergeant Carris's questions
regarding her alleged improper access of DAVID. Id.
at ¶ 4. During the interview, Defendant admitted that
she did not access Plaintiffs' information for any
criminal justice reason or other legitimate business purpose.
Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Instead, she accessed their
information out of curiosity. Id. at ¶ 6.
Defendant's Statement of Facts
also submitted a Statement of Material Facts in support of
her Motion for Summary Judgment, which proffered additional
facts. See ECF No. [44-2]. Plaintiffs did not
respond to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts. As
such, Defendant's proffered facts are deemed admitted to
the extent they are supported by the record. Such undisputed
facts are set forth below.
officers are limited by the databases they can access and the
type of information available to them on such databases.
See ECF No. [44-1] at ¶ 13. In this case,
neither Plaintiff knew that his or her information had been
accessed through DAVID or the Florida Crime Information
Centers (“FCIC”) databases until Plaintiffs
requested information through the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement by requesting a “TAR.” See
ECF No. [44-5] at 7. There is no evidence that either
Plaintiff was a victim of identity theft as a result of
Defendant's searches. See ECF No. [44-5] at 15,
22; ECF No. [44-6] at 19-20. Some of the information
Defendant obtained from the database searches were known to
Ms. Thibault's ex-husband, Jared Parke, who is currently
engaged to Defendant, such as Ms. Thibault's address and
social security number. See ECF No. [44-5] at 11 and
12. Ms. Thibault did not lose any job opportunities or miss
any work as a result of Defendant's actions. See
ECF No. [44-5] at 20. Mr. Letourneau works as a pilot and
testified that he missed two days from work as a result of
Defendant's actions. See ECF No. [44-6] at 17.
On one such occasion, he received a distressing call from Ms.
Thibault, which made him mentally unprepared to fly an
airplane, so he was sent home from Minneapolis. Id.
On those occasions, he took personal time off and did not
receive a deduction in his pay. Id. at 35. Mr.
Letourneau has not treated with a therapist and is not taking
any medications to treat psychological distress caused by
Defendant's actions. See ECF No. [44-6] at 16.
It is also undisputed that Defendant did not solicit or
recruit other police officers to harass, stalk or follow
Plaintiffs and Mr. Letourneau admits that police officers did
not deliberately follow him over the last four years.
See ECF No. [44-1]; ECF No. [44-6] at 29.
may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The parties may support their
positions by citation to the record, including, inter
alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or
declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is
genuine if “a reasonable trier of fact could return
judgment for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is
material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Id. (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The court views the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor.
See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir.
2006). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence
in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could
reasonably find for the [non-moving party].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh
conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta,
Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).
moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver
v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a
movant satisfies this burden, “the non-moving party
‘must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'”
Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 Fed.Appx.
819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must
make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the
case for which he has the burden of proof.'”
Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce
evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own
affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest
that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving
party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But
even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged
material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary
judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on
the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that
the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527
F.3d 1253, 1268-69, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave.,
Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs' Motions ...