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Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

December 11, 2017

THOMAS HARMON THOMAS, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

          ORDER

          JULIE S. SNEED UNTIED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Plaintiff, Thomas Harmon Thomas seeks judicial review of the denial of his claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. As the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence and employed proper legal standards, the decision is affirmed.

         BACKGROUND

         A. Procedural Background

         Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income on September 24, 2012. (Tr. 33, 99.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claims both initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 43, 518.) Upon Plaintiff's request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. (Tr. 605-643.) Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and accordingly denied Plaintiff's claims for benefits. (Tr. 21-32.) Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied. (Tr. 8-17.) Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court. (Dkt. 1). The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

         B. Factual Background and the ALJ's Decision

         Plaintiff, who was born in 1962, claimed disability beginning on September 20, 2010, which was subsequently amended to April 7, 2012. (Tr. 21, 99-112, 195, 609.) Plaintiff has a limited education. (Tr. 26.) Plaintiff's past relevant work experience included work as a terra cotta mason, marble installer, and a mason supervisor. (Tr. 30, 134.) Plaintiff alleged disability due to diabetes, neuropathy, tendonitis, retinopathy, and cardiac issues. (Tr. 125.)

         In rendering the decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since April 7, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 23.) After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, diabetes mellitus, type one with nephropathy, peripheral neuropathy and retinopathy, essential hypertension, and status post myocardial infarction with stent placement (Tr. 24.) Notwithstanding the noted impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 25.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional limitations:

occasional balancing and climbing of ramps or stairs; no balancing on uneven terrain; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no exposure to unprotected heights; limited to standing and walking in two hour segments for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; sitting unlimited; must avoid exposure to extreme hot temperatures; must avoid exposure to extreme industrial vibrations to all four extremities; near and far visual acuity limited to frequent; limited to frequent, as opposed to constant, field of vision; must avoid operating dangerous machinery or tools; no work involving tiny items such as screws or reading small print unless a magnifying glass is allowed; fine and gross manipulation is limited to frequent; feeling limited to frequent with the right hand; left upper extremity unlimited; and no driving motor vehicles at night.

(Tr. 25-26.) In formulating Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints and determined that, although the evidence established the presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiff's statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not fully credible. (Tr. 30.)

         Considering Plaintiff's noted impairments and the assessment of a vocational expert (“VE”), however, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 30.) Given Plaintiff's background and RFC, the VE testified that Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a cafeteria attendant, an usher, and a ticket taker. (Tr. 31.) Accordingly, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 31.)

         APPLICABLE STANDARDS

         To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning that the claimant must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

         The Social Security Administration, in order to regularize the adjudicative process, promulgated the detailed regulations currently in effect. These regulations establish a “sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. If an individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, i.e., one that significantly limits the ability to perform work-related functions; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and, (4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his or her prior work, step five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g).

         A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews the Commissioner's decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given to the legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

         In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the ALJ's decision. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner's failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates reversal. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066. The scope of review is thus limited to determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).

         ANALYSIS

         Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision on the following grounds: (1) the ALJ erred in posing a hypothetical to the VE that did not include all of Plaintiff's limitations; (2) the ALJ violated Plaintiff's due process and administrative rights by failing to consider a report by Dr. Robert Shefsky; (3) the ALJ failed to resolve inconsistencies between the testimony of the VE and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”); and (4) ...


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