United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
N. Scola, Jr. United States District Judge
Lopez Sierra has applied to proceed in the district court
without prepaying any fees or costs. (Pl.'s Mot., ECF No.
3.) Because Lopez Sierra has not paid the required filing
fee, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are
applicable. Under the statute, courts are permitted to
dismiss a suit “any time . . . the court determines
that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Upon initial screening, the Court finds Lopez Sierra's
complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, is frivolous, and must be dismissed.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Thereunder “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Consequently, “to state a plausible claim for relief,
the plaintiff must plead ‘factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.'”
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Lopez Sierra alleges the Puerto Rican government has planned
her death and that, similarly, Donald Trump has a paid a
billion dollars to have her killed. (Compl. at 1-2.) She also
complains, without providing any particularized facts, that
the Puerto Rican government, the United States Government,
the Florida government, and Miami Beach police have lied in
order to have her committed to a psychiatric hospital and
treatment center. (Id.) She elaborates that these
entities, or some of these entities, have also sent her to
jail and, in doing so, have somehow violated her speedy trial
rights. (Id. at 2.) According to Lopez Sierra,
“the world authorities” “and every
government in the world” has in “some way . . .
affected [her].” (Id.) Much of Lopez
Sierra's handwritten, two-page complaint is illegible or
Sierra's complaint fails to meet the standard for
plausibility articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly. It does not include sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, allowing the Court to reasonably
infer what her claim or claims for relief against the
Defendants may be. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d
553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] complaint will be
dismissed as insufficient where the allegations it contains
are vague and conclusory.”). Even under the relaxed
pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, Lopez
Sierra's pro se complaint fails to state a claim for
which relief may be granted. See Abele v. Tolbert,
130 Fed.Appx. 342, 343 (11th Cir. 2005).
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also authorize
courts to dismiss claims “at any time if the court
determines [the action] is frivolous or malicious.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1). “A claim is frivolous
if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.”
Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898
F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Section 1915
represents a balance between facilitating an indigent
person's access to the courts and curbing the potentially
vast number of suits by such persons, who, unlike those who
must pay in order to litigate their claims, have no economic
disincentives to filing frivolous or malicious suits once
in forma pauperis status is granted.”
Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 229 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327-28 (1989)). “To this end, the statute accords
judges . . . the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . [such
as] claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios,
claims with which federal district judges are all too
familiar.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
“The frivolousness determination is a discretionary
one.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
Sierra's allegations are “an archetype of
‘fantastic or delusional scenarios'” and
merit dismissal as factually frivolous. Awala v.
Gold, No. 08-20248-CIV, 2008 WL 540687, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 25, 2008) (Cooke, J.). See Denton, 504 U.S. at
33 (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is
appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.”). See also
Williams v. St. Vincent Hosp., 258 Fed.Appx. 293, 294
(11th Cir. 2007) (approving the district court's sua
sponte dismissal of a complaint that presented “a
far-fetched scenario based on assertions of a massive
conspiracy to monitor” the plaintiff); Biton v.
Holder, No. 10-61038-CIV, 2010 WL 4925799, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. June 23, 2010) (Moreno, J.) (dismissing a complaint
where there were “no credible factual allegations
accompanying the claims”). Because Lopez Sierra's
complaint fails to state a claim for relief and is frivolous,
dismissal is appropriate.
the Court denies Lopez Sierra's motion
to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No.
3), and dismisses the complaint
(ECF No. 1). The Clerk is directed to close
this case, and any pending motions are
denied as moot.