FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Patrice Moore,
L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew J. Salvia,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea S.
Alper, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
challenges an order requiring him to pay $3736.83 in
restitution. After A.J.S. admitted to committing the offenses
of burglary and obstructing an officer without violence, the
trial court withheld adjudication of delinquency and
sentenced him to one day of probation. Thereafter, the trial
court conducted a restitution hearing and determined that
A.J.S. and his codefendant owed restitution to the church
they burglarized, the First Baptist Church of St. Petersburg.
On appeal, A.J.S. argues that the trial court erred by
ordering him to pay restitution for the purchase of Lifelock,
Inc., memberships for thirteen church employees, which
totaled $3430.83. We agree and reverse.
restitution hearing, Philip Gregory Lilly testified that he
is the executive pastor at First Baptist Church. Mr. Lilly
testified that some cash and a thumb drive had been taken
during the burglary, and the thumb drive contained the home
addresses, social security numbers, and birth dates of
thirteen church employees. Mr. Lilly testified that the thumb
drive was never returned, so he purchased a Lifelock
membership for the employees to protect their personal
information, and the total cost of the memberships was
court may order a juvenile to pay restitution pursuant to
section 985.437(2), Florida Statutes (2015), "for any
damage or loss caused by the child's offense in a
reasonable amount or manner to be determined by the
court." The damage or loss at issue in this case was the
loss of the thumb drive. Mr. Lilly did not assert that there
was any damage or loss incurred by the church's employees
as a result of the theft. Although there are no cases on
point, we conclude that the purchase of Lifelock in this case
is akin to the purchase of a security system, as it protects
the victim against future harm.
J.M. v. State, 658 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA
1995), this court held that it was improper to include
"the cost of the after-acquired security system in the
restitution order because the relationship between the system
and [the appellant's] delinquent acts was not the
significant causal relationship contemplated by the
statute." See also Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d
44, 52-53 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering the appellant to pay
restitution for the victims' security system, reasoning
that the "home is now protected from future, unrelated
break-ins, and their home is in a better condition than
before [the] break-in"); In re T.W., 644 N.E.2d
438, 439 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994) (holding that trial court
improperly ordered restitution for security lights after
burglary because restitution "does not provide for
reimbursement of the cost of security measures added by a
victim following the commission of an offense").
However, we note that the theft of the personal information
in the present case could, if the information were given to
persons who used it improperly, place the victim at a greater
risk of harm, unlike the burglary of a home.
J.M. v. State, 661 So.2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA
1995), the Fourth District addressed a similar issue where
the appellant pleaded guilty to grand theft auto and
burglary, and the victim's keys, which had been lost the
week before, were used to steal the car. The Fourth District
held that the trial court erred in requiring the appellant to
pay restitution for the cost of changing the victim's
house locks. Id. at 1286. "Although prudence
may have suggested that [the victim] obtain new locks for his
home, there was no significant causal relation between [the
victim's] 'loss' in having to pay for new house
locks and the offenses which appellant committed."
present case, Mr. Lilly purchased Lifelock to prevent
possible future damages. As in J.M., although
prudence may have suggested that the church or the employees
purchase Lifelock, there was no significant causal
relationship between the burglary and the purchase of
Lifelock. See id. It was a security measure taken to
protect against prospective damages.
that the statute criminalizing the use of personal
identification information, section 817.568(15)(a), Florida
Statutes (2015), allows restitution for costs acquired by the
victim in clearing the victim's credit rating and credit
history. However, this presumes that there has been actual
damage to the victim's credit history and credit rating.
The statute does not provide for prospective damage when a
person's identification has been used unlawfully.
the trial court erred in ordering A.J.S. to pay restitution
for the purchase of Lifelock memberships for church employees
totaling $3430.83, and we reverse that portion of the
restitution order. ...