United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
CLYDE J. HOLLIDAY, III, Plaintiff,
LLOYD'S, UNDERWRITERS AT, LONDON, Defendant.
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Lloyd's, Underwriters at, London's Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. # 25), filed on December 5, 2017. Plaintiff Clyde J.
Holliday, III, responded on December 26, 2017. (Doc. # 34) .
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted and the
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
August 29, 2017, Holliday filed his Complaint against
Defendant Lloyds Syndicate 3000 at Lloyds, London. (Doc. # 1)
. The Complaint was "a filled-in form provided by the
Clerk's Office with only a single sentence outlining the
basis and nature of Holliday's claim." (Doc. # 3 at
4). The Court dismissed the Complaint as "a shotgun
pleading to which Defendant cannot be expected to
respond" because it was “unclear what causes of
action [were] being asserted and the factual basis for those
claims.” (Id. at 5). The Court advised that,
“[i]f Holliday wishes to assert more than one cause of
action, he must separate and clearly label those
claims.” (Id. at 4).
filed his Amended Complaint on October 2, 2017, naming
“Lloyd's, Underwriters at, London” as the
sole defendant. (Doc. # 9). Again, Holliday's statement
of his claim was a single sentence: “This action is
being brought to recover monies owing to Plaintiff resulting
from the finalization of account under Lloyd's Line Slip
#8565100 evidenced by the attached exhibit #1 ref: IBSL
Settlement Box - Premiums Resulting in an Overall Return
Premium which remains unpaid.” (Id. at 4). The
Court dismissed the Amended Complaint with leave to amend on
October 11, 2017, advising Holliday to “clearly
identify the cause of action he is asserting” and to
“include details about his relationship with
Lloyd's Underwriters at London and the alleged
misconduct.” (Doc. # 9).
then filed the Second Amended Complaint against
“Lloyd's, Underwriters at, London” on October
25, 2017. (Doc. # 12). The Second Amended Complaint asserts
four counts, “Concealment of Records and Fraud, ”
and “False Reporting and Slander.”
(Id.). Holliday alleges he was a “surplus
lines licensed [insurance] agent” through “BMS
Special Risk Services, a London Broking Firm” until
October of 2008. (Id. at 3). At that time,
Lloyd's “cancell[ed] the surplus lines agent's
authority to sell policies of insurance” without cause,
causing Holliday to lose business. (Id.).
Lloyd's also allegedly illegally removed and transferred
Holliday's proprietary client files from his computer and
continued to deny Holliday access to these “proprietary
client files and accounting information.” (Id.
at 3-4). Finally, Lloyd's allegedly slandered Holliday
through its “false and malicious reporting of a felony
. . . for which [Holliday] was arrested and indicted by the
Polk County State Attorney” but which was dismissed two
or three years later because Holliday was able to exonerate
himself. (Id. at 4).
December 5, 2017, Lloyd's moved to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 25). Holliday has responded, (Doc.
# 34), and the Motion is now ripe for review.
Court construes pro se pleadings liberally and holds them to
a less stringent standard than those drafted by 2003). But,
“a pro se litigant is still required to conform to
procedural rules, and a district judge is not required to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” McFarlin v. Douglas
County, 587 F. App'x 593, 595 (11th Cir. 2014).
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court
accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262
(11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the plaintiff
with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)(internal citations omitted). Courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “The scope of
review must be limited to the four corners of the
complaint” and attached exhibits. St. George v.
Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may attack jurisdiction facially or
factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920,
924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). In factual attacks, the Court
delves into the arguments asserted by the parties and the
credibility of the evidence presented. Garcia v.
Copenhaver, Bell, & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260-61
(11th Cir. 1997). “Factual attacks challenge subject
matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.
In resolving a factual attack, the district court may
consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and
affidavits.” Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925.