final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Robert M.
Kristopher D. Robinson of Robinson Collins P.L.,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Stephen Alexander of Alexander Law Firm, LLC, St. Augustine,
the former husband, seeks review of the order dismissing the
suit he filed against Appellee, the former wife, to set aside
the consent final judgment in the parties' divorce
proceeding. Because the trial court reached the right result-
albeit for the wrong reason-we affirm under the "tipsy
former wife allegedly obtained photos of the former husband
and his mistress that were "of a private nature, "
and she used the photos as leverage in the parties'
divorce proceeding to coerce the former husband to enter into
a mediated settlement that was favorable to her. The terms of
the settlement were incorporated into a consent final
judgment that was entered by the circuit court in Clay County
in January 2014.
than 2½ years later, in August 2016, after several
unsuccessful attempts to modify the consent final judgment,
former husband filed a complaint in the circuit court in
Duval County seeking to set aside the consent final judgment.
The complaint alleged that the former wife told the former
husband that "she would expose the photos if she did not
get a satisfactory settlement from the [divorce]
proceeding" and that the mediator told the former
husband that "if [he] did not give [the former wife]
what she wanted, with the physical evidence [the former wife]
had against [him], [he] would be refused time-sharing with
[his] children, would owe alimony . . . in addition to child
support and would have to pay thirty thousand dollars ($30,
000) in attorney's fees to [the former wife]'s
attorney." The complaint asserted that these
"strong-arm and extortionate tactics" amounted to
"fraud on the court."
former wife filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue or,
alternatively, to transfer the case to Clay County where
proceedings to modify the consent final judgment were
ongoing. The former husband responded that venue was proper
in Duval County because both parties now reside there, and he
argued that the case should not be transferred to Clay County
because, under Gordon v. Gordon, 625 So.2d 59 (Fla.
4th DCA 1993), "an independent action was required under
Florida law to set aside the [consent final judgment] for
fraud upon the court because it had been more than a year
since the [judgment] was entered."
trial court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that
"it is apparent that the same issues raised in this case
are also being litigated in [the Clay County case]." The
court reiterated this point in the order denying the former
husband's motion for rehearing, explaining that "the
issues raised in [the former husband]'s complaint in this
case are and should be litigated in the Clay County
case." The court thereafter entered a final order
dismissing this case with prejudice.
review the dismissal order under the de novo
standard of review, see Ogborn v. Zingale, 988 So.2d
56, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and our review focuses on the
result reached by the trial court, not its reasoning, see
Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, 731
So.2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) ("[I]f a trial court reaches
the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be
upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment
in the record.").
agree with the former husband that the trial court should not
have dismissed the case with prejudice based on the venue
motion filed by the former wife. Venue was proper in Duval
County because both parties reside there, see
section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and transfer-not
dismissal-is the proper remedy where the trial court
determines that there is a more convenient forum,
see section 47.122, Florida Statutes. Moreover,
abatement-not dismissal-would have been the proper remedy if
the trial court was correct in concluding that the issues