United States District Court, S.D. Florida
E. Martinez, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
M. OTAZO-REYES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Daniel Jones'
("Defendant" or "Jones") Motion to
Suppress [D.E. 272]. This matter was referred to the
undersigned by the Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States
District Judge, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,
Section 636 [D.E. 277]. The undersigned held an evidentiary
hearing on this matter on January 4, 2018 [D.E. 301]. For the
reasons stated below, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that Defendant's Motion to Suppress be DENIED.
November 17, 2017, Jones was charged in a Superseding
Indictment (hereafter, "Indictment") with the
Count 1: Racketeering Conspiracy, from January 2000 to May 9,
2017, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
Count 2: Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute a
Controlled Substance, from January 2000 to May 9, 2017, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Count 3: Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug
Trafficking Crime, from September 2012 to May 9, 2017, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
See Indictment [D.E. 193]. The Indictment, which consists of
23 counts and charges a total of fourteen defendants, alleges
the existence of a criminal enterprise in Northern Miami-Dade
County, Florida that sought to generate income through
narcotics distribution and robberies and engaged in acts of
violence. Id. at 3. The enterprise was allegedly
formed under the leadership of Isaac Thompson
("Thompson"), with the leadership role taken over
by Antonio Glass ("Glass") upon Thompson's
incarceration in 2012. Id. Glass is the lead
defendant in the Indictment. Id. at 1.
11, 2016, law enforcement officers stopped a vehicle driven
by Jones in which Glass was a passenger. See Motion to
Suppress [D.E. 272 at 1], At the time, law enforcement seized
a cellular phone from Jones, which item was subsequently
searched pursuant to a federal search warrant obtained on
June 15, 2016. Id. at 1-2. Jones seeks to suppress
the cellular phone and all evidence associated with it on the
grounds that he was illegally detained and that the phone was
seized without probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal
Fourth Amendment protects "the people" from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const,
amend. IV. A seizure occurs in the context of the Fourth
Amendment "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away."
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 n.5 (1981)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). See
also Brower v. Ctv. of Invo. 489 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1989) (A Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs
"when there is a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally
applied"). An individual is in custody if,
"under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
man in the [individual's] position would feel a restraint
on his freedom of movement fairly characterized as that
'degree associated with a formal arrest' to such
extent that he would not feel free to leave." United
States v. Phillips. 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir.
1987). See a]so United States v. Long, 866 F.2d 402,
405 (11th Cir. 1989) ("A suspect is considered in
custody if a reasonable person would believe that he were not
free to leave; for example, if the officers brandished
weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that
indicated that compliance with the officers could be
compelled."). The reasonableness standard embodied in
the Fourth Amendment is articulated in "the general rule
that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential
attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is
supported by probable cause." Summers, 452 U.S.
a warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid depends
"upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the
officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment
the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See also
United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1524 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("Probable cause to arrest exists where the
facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge,
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed.").
The Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal
Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Mincev v Arizona. 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978) (citations omitted). "Among the exceptions to
the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful
arrest." Arizona v. Gant. 556 U.S. 332, 338
(2009). Additionally, under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement a vehicle search does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if, "under the totality of the
circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle."
United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261-62
(11th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Fruit of the poisonous tree
the long established exclusionary rule, "evidence seized
during an unlawful search [can] not constitute proof against
the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (citing Weeks v.
United States. 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). "The
exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as
the direct products of such invasions." Id. at
484-85 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States. 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). Moreover, the exclusionary
rule applies equally to physical and verbal evidence.
Id. at 485. As further explained by the Supreme
Court, not "all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree
simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question
in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint." Id. at 487-88 (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Testimonial and ...