United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants
Carrington's Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie
Carrington's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 44),
which was filed on December 10, 2017. Plaintiffs Agatha
Thomas, Marie Edward, and Angel Dancil filed a response in
opposition (Doc. # 46) on December 21, 2017. For the reasons
that follow, the Court denies the Motion.
Plaintiff home healthcare workers (Agatha Thomas, Marie
Edward, and Angel Dancil) sue four separate Defendants
(Carrington's Caring Angels, LLC, Stephanie Carrington,
Ronshai Davis, and AAJA Love Care, Inc.) in this FLSA action.
(Doc. # 1). Two Defendants, Davis and AAJA Love Care, Inc.,
are in default and have not participated in the proceedings.
(Doc. ## 25, 26). The two active Defendants, Carrington's
Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie Carrington, have filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 44). The Carrington
Defendants argue: (1) they are not an
“enterprise” covered by the FLSA; (2) they had no
involvement with Thomas and Dancil; and (3) Edward worked as
an independent contractor for only three weeks and was not an
employee. As explained below, the Carrington Defendants have
not met their burden of establishing that they are entitled
to relief as a matter of law on these issues. The Court
accordingly denies the Motion for Summary Judgment.
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a
grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Mize
v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th
Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is
material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d
642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the initial
burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on
file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that
should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm
Co., Inc. 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the
non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,
' and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, '
designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc.,
64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324).
there is a conflict between the parties' allegations or
evidence, the non-moving party's evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party's favor. Shotz v. City of
Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a
reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw
more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference
introduces a genuine issue of material fact, the court should
not grant summary judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v.
City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988).
(citing Augusta Iron & Steel Works, Inc. v.
Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir.
1988)). But, if the non-movant's response consists of
nothing “more than a repetition of his conclusional
allegations, ” summary judgment is not only proper, but
required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th
FLSA Coverage and the Home Care Final Rule
Complaint alleges that the Carrington Defendants “are
an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
FLSA.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 17). Generally speaking,
“the FLSA covers a company if the company's gross
receipts equal or exceed $500, 000 and if the company employs
any person who either engages in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce or handles, sells, or
otherwise works on goods or materials that have been moved in
or produced for commerce.” Clements v. Randolph
Hotel, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-3395-T-23TBM, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76261, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2017)(internal citation
omitted). The Carrington Defendants assert they have not
grossed $500, 000, and therefore, enterprise coverage does
not exist. “Carrington's Caring Angels, LLC is just
an up and coming business and does not make anywhere close to
$500, 000 per year.” (Carrington Aff. Doc. # 45 at
do not weigh in on whether the Carrington Defendants meet the
$500, 000 gross income requirement for FLSA enterprise
coverage. Instead, they contend that recent legislation, the
Home Care Final Rule, mandates Plaintiffs be paid FLSA
overtime: “Regardless of the gross earning of the
Employer, the change in the law effective January 1, 2015, in
essence, makes an agency providing home care services
obligated to pay minimum wages and overtime pay.” (Doc.
# 46 at 18).
explain that, prior to October 13, 2015, the FLSA exempted
domestic service employees from minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). But,
on October 1, 2013, the Department of Labor issued the Home
Care Final Rule. 29 C.F.R. § 552. The Home Care Final
Rule became effective on October 13, 2015, after various
appellate proceedings took place. See Alves v. Affiliated
Home Care of Putnam, Inc., No. 16-cv-1593 (KMK), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17893, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,
2017)(describing application of the Home Care Final Rule).
submit that, under the Home Care Final Rule, direct care
workers are deemed covered under the FLSA and are entitled to
overtime pay if any of the following apply:
1. If they are employed by an agency or another employer
other than the person being assisted or that ...