United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
KANE PREE, an individual and BLAKE PREE, an individual, Plaintiffs,
PICKLE PRO, LLC, a Florida limited liability corporation and TODD PREE, an individual, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
E. STEELE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs Kane Pree and
Blake Pree's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #39) filed
on December 29, 2017. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to
Count I against the defaulted party, Pickle Pro, LLC (Pickle
Pro) only. The case otherwise remains pending against Todd
Pree. Also before the Court is plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney's Fees (Doc. #38) filed on the same day. No
response has been filed to either motion, and the time to
respond has expired.
judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is
‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R”
Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact
is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the
suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The motion must be
supported by citing to materials in the record, or or by
showing that the nonmoving party cannot produce admissible
evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
party fails to properly respond, the Court may consider the
facts undisputed and “grant summary judgment if the
motion and supporting materials--including the facts
considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to
it. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The “complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In such a case, the moving party is
“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”, much
like a directed verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).
Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).
December 18, 2017, the Court issued an Opinion and Order
(Doc. #37) granting in part plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Default Judgment Against Defendant Pickle Pro, LLC (Doc. #33)
as to Count II, brought by Kane Pree only, and dismissing
Count III without Court I without prejudice to filing a
request for summary judgment because the Court found:
There no factual statements in the Complaint as to what
plaintiffs did for their employers, or what commerce Pickle
Pro was actually engaged in, or how Pickle Pro impacted
interstate commerce through its activities. Additionally,
there are no factual allegations as to the gross revenues, or
as to how many employees worked for Pickle Pro.
(Doc. #37, p. 7.) The Court withheld the entry of judgment in
favor of Kane Pree on Count II for breach of contract in the
amount of $36, 265.25 for unpaid wages pending the conclusion
of the case.
Opinion and Order, the Court set forth the factual basis for
a default judgment deemed admitted by Pickle Pro by virtue of
its default. (Id., pp. 3-4.) The facts are hereby
incorporated herein. The Court further noted that additional
facts set forth by Declaration supported judgment in favor of
plaintiffs, but that “none of these factual allegations
are contained in the Complaint and therefore are not deemed
admitted by Pickle Pro.” (Id., p. 8.)
Plaintiffs have now filed their request for summary judgment,
and have incorporated and re-submitted the previously filed
Declarations in support of summary judgment.
Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim
for a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and
are entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs have established
that they were not paid their overtime compensation for hours
worked in excess of the forty hour workweek. Plaintiffs seek
damages for the unpaid overtime wages, as well as an equal
amount for liquidated damages as authorized under the FLSA.
The amounts set forth in the Declarations will be awarded as
Kane Pree seek attorney fees under Fla. Stat. § 448.08
as to Count II. The Court previously found that attorney fees
could be awarded for unpaid wage contracts, and directed that
the motion be filed separately after the entry of judgment.
(Doc. #3, p. 10.) The Court is herein granting summary
judgment in favor of both plaintiffs as to Count I, and
plaintiffs collectively have made a demand for attorney fees
under the FLSA, see doc. #1, p. 6. Since the FLSA
also permits an award of a “reasonable attorney's
fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action”, 29 ...