FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Edward Nicholas,
L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T.
Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN- YOUAKIM, JUDGE.
appeal originally came to us pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Upon our de novo review
of the record and after ordering additional briefing, we
affirm the judgment and sentence, as well as the order of sex
offender probation that was signed on June 29, 2016, but was
not filed until September 8, 2016. However, because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions of sex
offender probation that it previously had affirmatively
declined to impose, we vacate the trial court's September
8, 2016, order modifying that June 29, 2016, order without
prejudice to a timely modification under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) following the issuance of our
mandate in this appeal.
29, 2016, on remand following this court's vacatur of
Sameh Salib Soliman's conviction for using a computer to
solicit a child to commit a sex act, see Soliman v.
State, 185 So.3d 647, 648-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), the
trial court orally resentenced Soliman to concurrent terms of
three years' imprisonment for traveling to meet a minor
(count one), see § 847.0135(4)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2013), and attempted lewd or lascivious battery (count
three), see §§ 800.04(4)(a), 777.04, Fla.
Stat. (2013). The court ordered that those terms be followed
by concurrent terms of three years' sex offender
probation on count one and two years' sex offender
probation on count three. The court expressly and
affirmatively declined, however, to impose most of the
conditions of sex offender probation,  although those
conditions were statutorily mandatory for count three.
See § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2013).
September 8, 2016-after the trial court had orally pronounced
the sentence and after Soliman had filed the notice of appeal
giving rise to this appeal but before the court had filed any
written order of sex offender probation with the clerk of the
circuit court-the court, pursuant to the parties'
stipulation, ordered that Soliman's sentence be modified
to include conditions of sex offender probation that it
previously had affirmatively declined to include. Neither the
parties' stipulation nor the court's order identified
any authority for the court's modification of the
conditions of Soliman's sex offender probation at that
point. On that same date, the trial court filed both the
order granting the parties' stipulation and its order of
sex offender probation. This written order of sex offender
probation, however, bore a signature date of June 29, 2016,
and was, on its face, consistent with the court's oral
pronouncement rather than with the court's modification
trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the conditions of
Soliman's sex offender probation. In Poplar v State, 842
So.2d 902, 903 (Fla 2d DCA 2003), this court adopted the
rationale of Kiriazes v State, 798 So.2d 789, 792-94 (Fla 5th
DCA 2001), which held that the failure to impose mandatory
standard conditions of sex offender probation results in an
"incomplete" sentence correctable under rule
3800(c) See also Schutte v State, 824 So.2d 308, 308 (Fla 1st
DCA 2002) (following Kiriazes) But see Beal v State, 978
So.2d 825, 825-27 (Fla 1st DCA 2008) (Padovano, J, concurring
in result) (explaining why failing to impose statutorily
mandated condition of probation should instead be
characterized as resulting in "illegal" sentence
correctable under rule 3.800(a)). That rule permits a court to
reduce or modify to include any of the provisions of chapter
948, Florida Statutes, a legal sentence imposed by it, sua
sponte, or upon motion filed, within 60 days after the
imposition, or within 60 days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued by the appellate court on affirmance of the
judgment and/or sentence on an original appeal . . . .
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c).
"imposition" of the legal sentence that triggered
the first sixty-day window, however, was the trial
court's oral pronouncement of June 29, 2016. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) ("The term sentence means the
pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed on a
defendant for the offense of which the defendant has been
adjudged guilty."); Gonzalez v. State, 979
So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("The State
maintains that 'imposition' of sentence means the
oral pronouncement required by Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.700, and that the oral pronouncement should start
the time period for purposes of rule 3.800(c). We
agree."). The sixtieth day following sentencing was
Sunday, August 28, 2016, so the parties had until Monday,
August 29, 2016, to timely move under rule 3.800(c). See
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.040; Fla. R. Jud. Admin.
2.514(a)(1)(C). The parties' undated stipulation was not
filed until September 8, 2016. Therefore, construed as a
motion under rule 3.800(c), the stipulation was untimely and,
therefore, inadequate to vest in the trial court jurisdiction
to add to the conditions of sex offender probation those
conditions that it had previously explicitly declined to
impose. See Poplar, 842 So.2d at 903 (quoting
Kiriazes, 798 So.2d at 794).
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its oral
pronouncement of the conditions imposed on Soliman's sex
offender probation. We thus vacate the trial court's
September 8, 2016, order modifying its June 29, 2016, order
of sex offender probation without prejudice to a timely
modification under rule 3.800(c) following the issuance of
our mandate in this appeal. In all other respects, we affirm
the judgment and sentence, ...