United States District Court, S.D. Florida
JOSE MEJIA, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.
BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CAUSE is before the Court upon the Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay All Court Proceedings
and Accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support, ECF No. 
(“Motion”), filed by Defendant Uber Technologies
Inc. (“Defendant” or “Uber”) on
September 20, 2017. Plaintiff Jose Mejia
(“Plaintiff” or “Mejia”) filed an
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 
(“Opposition”), and Defendant replied, ECF No.
. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all
supporting and opposing materials, the record, and is
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for
lack of standing.
Factual and Procedural Background
filed his Complaint, ECF No.  (“Complaint”) on
August 11, 2017, alleging a single cause of action styled as
“Violation of Section 790.251, Florida Statutes”
and seeking declaratory relief and damages on behalf of
himself and a putative class. According to the Complaint,
since June 2015, Uber has maintained a policy that
“prohibit[s] drivers and riders from carrying
guns.” ECF No.  ¶ 7. Mejia, who is licensed in
the State of Florida to carry a concealed weapon or firearm,
alleges that he began work as an “Uber driver, offering
transportation services primarily in the Miami-Dade, Broward,
and Palm Beach Counties” in March 2016. Id.
¶¶ 6, 8. Plaintiff “wishes to carry a firearm
in his vehicle while he provides transportation services
through Uber.” Id. ¶ 8. Based on these
allegations, Mejia claims that Uber has violated his rights
and the rights of a putative class of Uber drivers who offer
transportation services in Florida and possess a license to
carry a concealed weapon or firearm. Id.
¶¶ 11, 23.
response to the Complaint, Defendant moves to compel
arbitration. Specifically, Defendant argues that before
Plaintiff began providing transportation services as an Uber
driver, he entered into a Technology Services Agreement with
Raiser-DC, LLC, Uber's wholly owned subsidiary (the
“Raiser Agreement”). ECF No.  at 2. The
Raiser Agreement contains an arbitration provision and a
class action waiver. See ECF No. [11-1]. Uber notes
that the Raiser Agreement allows any Uber driver to opt out
of the arbitration provision by sending notice to Uber via
mail or email, and Plaintiff never opted out. Id. at
8-9. Uber thus argues that these provisions are binding on
Mejia, and any claims he may have must be arbitrated
individually pursuant to the Raiser Agreement. Id.
Opposition, Plaintiff argues that because of Florida's
“rigorous statutory framework enshrining the
constitutional right to bear arms, ” the arbitration
clause is unconstitutional as applied. ECF No.  at 6-7.
Plaintiff further argues that the arbitration provision is
procedurally unconscionable because there is no meaningful
way to opt out of the arbitration provision since the process
must be completed by mail or email and cannot be completed
through Uber's smartphone application. Id. at
11. Plaintiff also argues that the Raiser Agreement is
procedurally unconscionable because “it is unreasonable
to expect individuals to be able to read legal documents on a
smartphone.” Id. at 12. Finally, Plaintiff
argues that the arbitration provision is substantively
unconscionable because it attempts to strip Plaintiff of
rights that “may not be infringed upon, ” namely
Plaintiff's alleged right under Florida law to keep a
concealed weapon in his vehicle while driving for Uber.
Id. at 8-12.
the parties have not raised the issue of standing, the Court
properly considers this threshold jurisdictional question
prior to adjudication of the Motion before the Court.
Bischoff v. Osceola Cty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877-78
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that, where not briefed by the
parties, “the district court correctly reached out and
considered the question of standing sua
sponte”). “Article III of the Constitution
limits the ‘judicial power' of the United States to
the resolution of ‘cases' and
‘controversies.' ” DiMaio v. Democratic
Nat. Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
471 (1982)). Critical to the case-or-controversy requirement
of Article III is an inquiry into standing (id.
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992))), which “is a threshold
jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and
independent of the merits of a party's claims.”
Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d
964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005). “That a plaintiff seeks
relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201, does not relieve him of the burden of satisfying the
prerequisites for standing, since a declaratory judgment may
only be issued in the case of an actual controversy.”
Id. (quoting Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d
1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted).
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
proving the essential elements of standing. Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561; Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199,
1205-06 (11th Cir. 2006). Given the procedural posture in
this case, the Court looks to the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Complaint and any attached documents to
the Motion central to Plaintiff's claims to determine
standing. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d
1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994); Maxcess, Inc. v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir.
2005). However, “[i]t is not enough that ‘the
[plaintiff]'s complaint sets forth facts from which [the
Court] could imagine an injury sufficient to satisfy Article
III's standing requirements.' ” Elend,
471 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm'n, 226 F.3d 1226,
1229 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)). Rather, a
plaintiff must satisfy three constitutional prerequisites of
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
DiMaio, 520 F.3d at 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61); see also Dermer v.
Miami-Dade Cnty., 599 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Standing for Article III purposes requires a
plaintiff to provide evidence of an injury in fact, causation
and redressibility.”); Kelly v. Harris, 331
F.3d 817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To have standing, a
plaintiff must show (1) he has suffered an injury in fact
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant; and (3) it is
likely, not just merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”).
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he possesses a license to
carry a concealed weapon from the State of Florida and that
he “wishes to carry a firearm in his vehicle while he
provides transportation services through Uber.” ECF No.
 at 8. Plaintiff further pleads that “[t]hrough its
no-firearm policy, Uber has violated the rights of Plaintiff,
and other members of the Class, as those rights are described
under subsections 790.251(4)(c)-(d), Florida Statutes.”
Id. ¶ 23. However, these allegations, without
more, do not sufficiently plead an injury in fact, that is,
the invasion of a legally protected interest that is
“concrete and particularized” and “actual
or imminent” as required by the Lujan test.
First, Plaintiff only alleges that he “wishes” to
carry his firearm while driving for Uber, but does not allege
that he tried to do so or that Uber has attempted to enforce
the Policy against him. See DiMaio, 520 F.3d at
1302-03 (“DiMaio's right to vote, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, cannot be impaired by the DNC's
failure to consider a ballot that he did not cast in the
first place.”). Second, the Policy states that
Defendant “prohibits riders and drivers from carrying
firearms of any kind in a vehicle while using [Uber's]
app . . . to the extent permitted by applicable law.”
See ECF No.  at 15-16. The crux of
Plaintiff's claim is that the Policy conflicts with
Florida Statute 790.251(4)(c)-(d), even though the plain
language of the Policy carves out the conflict Plaintiff
complains of and Uber has not otherwise attempted to enforce
the Policy against Mejia. Instead Plaintiff requests this
Court to extrapolate how, if at all, Uber might enforce the
Policy against Plaintiff and the putative class. Plaintiff
speculates that Uber may prohibit him from keeping his
firearm in his vehicle while using the Uber application,
allegedly in contravention of Florida law, but this
hypothesis does not “support a finding of the
‘actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require” and defies the plain language of the policy.
Elend, 471 F.3d at 1209 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
first prong of the Lujan test. Rather, the relief
that Plaintiff seeks, “that the Court declare that
Defendant's conduct violates the statute referenced
herein, ” ECF No.  at 6, is an impermissible
“exercise in purely advisory decision-making.”
DiMaio, 520 F.3d at 1303. Because Plaintiff lacks
standing, the Court refrains from further consideration of
the Motion and this action must be dismissed for lack of
it is ORDERED AND ...