United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT
COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS AND DISMISSING
G. COOKE United States District Judge
MATTER is before me on the Emergency Claim for Enforcement of
Federal Civil Rights and Temporary Restraining Order
(“Claim”) (ECF No. 1), Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No.3),
and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No.
Mr. Ronald Freeman (“Plaintiff”) brings this
action pro se in the name of United States pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) to provide relief
for the benefit of Ronald Freeman. I have reviewed Plaintiffs
filings and the relevant legal authority. For the reasons
provided herein, Plaintiffs Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs is denied and
Plaintiffs Claim is dismissed.
shall dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis
“at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). A pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain “a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction, ” as well as “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.
P. 8(a)(1)-(2). The facts pleaded in a complaint must state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, the
“short and plain statement of the claim” in the
complaint must be sufficient to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However,
the leniency shown to pro se litigants “does
not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order
to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted), overruled on other grounds, as recognized by
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010).
“While the pleadings of pro se litigants are
‘liberally construed, ' they must still comply with
procedural rules governing the proper form of
pleadings.” Hopkins v. Saint Lucie County School
Bd, 399 Fed.Appx. 563, 565 (11th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished) (citations omitted).
Claim does not contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(2). Plaintiffs Claim
[T]he UNITED STATES prays that this court issue a writ
Ordering Steven T. Mnuchin, as Secretary of the Treasury, and
all agents working in concert with him to enforce all of
RONALD FREEMAN'S substantive Federal Civil Rights, to
perform their ministerial duties and contractual obligations
with regard to their physical taking and usage of RONALD
FREEMAN'S private property on all public Debt securities
issued by Federal, State and local government agencies of the
United States or any other securities used as collateral for
ECF No. 1, 7. Plaintiff goes on to allege Jovita
Carranza and Steven T. Mnuchin have each
“maintained an unrevoked contractual offer to the
general public” and are obligated under the 5th
Amendment to justly compensate him for their use of his
private property. Id. at 2. Plaintiff does not
specify what private property Ms. Carranza and Mr.Mnuchin
used, but states:
At a1l times relevant to this complaint RONALD FREEMAN
extended his personal credit to Federal, State and local
government agencies of the United States that physically took
and used his valuable private property within public debt
securities deposited into banks as collateral for Legal
Tender of the United States, the subject of the securities
are his personal, trade and family names.
Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that as a direct result
of the conduct of the Secretary of Treasury and his agents,
he has been made “legally incompetent to enforce and
make contracts for the purpose of directly inheriting and
holding legal tender due from the United States . . .
.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also states he is
“unable to enforce any of his rights secured by the
first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a
‘black' inhabitant in any of the State or local
courts” because he “expressly rejects any and all
contractual offers to enforce the 14th amendment of the
United States Constitution for his benefit, as said amendment
confers no substantive rights to him or any other
person.” Id. at 5.
aside the fact that Plaintiff has not cited a federal statute
allowing him to bring an action in the name of the United
States as per Rule 17(a)(2), the twenty paragraphs set forth
in the Claim do not collectively establish, or put Defendant
on notice, of any viable causes of action Plaintiff intends
to pursue. Plaintiffs Claim is incoherent and does not
include a short and plain statement of the grounds for this
Court's jurisdiction. What is more, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “abolished” writs of mandamus and
now direct parties to file an “appropriate action or
motion” where similar relief is available. Fed.R.Civ.P.
81(b). Accordingly, I find that Plaintiffs Claim for
Enforcement is frivolous and does not contain “an
arguable basis in law or in fact.” See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 3) is
DENIED. Plaintiffs Emergency Claim for Enforcement of Federal
Civil Rights and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 1) is
DISMISSED without prejudice. All