United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Ocala Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [1]
PHILIP
R. LAMMENS United States Magistrate Judge
Mr.
Rolle has been a frequent litigator in this District and the
Northern District of Florida, filing repeated civil rights
actions pursuant to § 1983 against judges, prosecutors,
appointed and privately retained attorneys, probation
officers, and the City of Tallahassee, related to his 2002
state court conviction and subsequent probation violation
proceedings. His claims have been repeatedly dismissed as
frivolous. See e.g., Rolle v. Glenn, No.
4:17-cv-134-MW-CAS, (N.D. Fla. March 31, 2017), aff'd,
2017 WL 4708166 (11th Cir. 2017); Rolle v.
Glenn, No. 5:15-cv-190-Oc-39PRL (M.D. Fla. January 27,
2017), Rolle v. Raysor, No. 5:15-cv-180-Oc-30PRL
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2015); Rolle v. Maceluch, No.
5:15-cv-191-Oc-30PRL (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2015); Rolle v.
U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 5:15-cv-192-Oc22PRL (M.D. Fla.
July 20, 2015); Rolle v. Edwards, No.
5:15-cv-202-Oc-30PRL (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2015); Rolle v.
Raysor, No. 5:15-cv-268-Oc-30PRL (M.D. Fla. June 3,
2015); Rolle v. Edwards, No. 5:15-cv-271- Oc-34PRL
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2015); Rolle v. Maceluch et
al, No. 5:15-cv-285-MMH-PRL (October 8, 2015), Rolle
v. Bruce, No. 5:15-cv-320-Oc-22PRL (M.D. Fla. July 24,
2015), Rolle v. City of Tallahassee, et al., No.
5:15-cv-462-JSM-PRL (September 14, 2015); Rolle v.
Dilmore, et al, No. 4:14-cv-339-RH-CAS (N.D. Fla. July
23, 2014).
Mr.
Rolle has been repeatedly cautioned that sanctions would be
imposed against him for filing frivolous complaints, and
sanctions have been imposed on at least two occasions. In
October 2015, he was sanctioned $200.00 in the Middle
District of Florida, see Rolle v. City of Tallahassee, et
al., No. 5:15-cv-462-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. October 8, 2015)
(Moody, J.), and in May 2017, he was prospectively banned
from filing new cases related to his January 4, 2002 arrest
unless he paid the entire filing fee in the Northern District
of Florida, See Rolle v. Dilmore, et al., No.
4:16-cv-425-RH-GRJ (N.D. Fla. May 23, 2017) (Hinkle, J.).
Undeterred,
during the first few weeks of January 2018, Plaintiff filed
six new cases in this Court, arising largely out of the same
events addressed in previous lawsuits. See Rolle v. West
et al., No. 5:18-cv-8-JSM-PRL, Rolle v. Robinson et
al., No. 5:18-cv-13-JSM-PRL, Rolle v. Shelfer et
al., No. 5:18-cv-18-JSM-PRL, Rolle v. City of
Tallahassee et al., No. 5:18-cv-25-JSM-PRL, Rolle v.
City of Tallahassee et al., No. 5:18-cv-45-JSM-PRL,
Rolle v. Perry, et al., No. 5:18-cv-46-JSM-PRL.
Plaintiff has also filed motions to proceed in forma
pauperis.
I.
Legal Standards
Before
a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court is obligated to review the complaint
to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, “fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[, ]”
or . . . “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is
required to dismiss the suit sua sponte. Id.
“A
lawsuit is frivolous if the plaintiff's realistic chances
of ultimate success are slight.” Clark v. Ga.
Pardons and Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir.
1984) (internal citations omitted). The district court may
dismiss a complaint under § 1915 on grounds of
frivolousness if an affirmative defense would defeat the
action. Id. at 640. For example, the absolute
immunity of the defendant would justify the dismissal of a
claim as frivolous. Id. at 640, n. 2. “When
the defense is apparent from the fact of a complaint or the
court's records, courts need not wait and see if the
defense will be asserted in a defensive pleading.”
Id. “Indigence does not create a
constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds and
the valuable time of the courts in order to prosecute an
action which is totally without merit.” Phillips v.
Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing
Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir.
1979)).
In
evaluating a complaint under § 1915, a document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The bare minimum a
plaintiff must set forth in the complaint is found in
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and explained further in Iqbal and
Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). “A pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While particularity is not required
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, as it is under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9,
“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). The court must view the allegations of the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
consider the allegations of the complaint as true, and accept
all reasonable inferences therefrom. La Grasta v. First
Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). In
considering the sufficiency of the complaint, the court
limits its “consideration to the well-pleaded factual
allegations, documents central to or referenced in the
complaint, and matters judicially noticed.”
Id.
II.
Discussion
A.
Plaintiff's claims
Although
the allegations begin (as they do with all of his cases) with
Plaintiff's 2002 conviction, the complaint in this case
focuses on events following his release from jail in July
2016. Plaintiff alleges that upon his release, he was told to
report to a probation office in Tallahassee, but that he did
not go there “due to his continued unfair and
unconstitutional treatment by numerous state officials and no
adequate remedies available.” He alleges that he was
never told to report to the Ocala Probation Office, but that
probation officers Robinson and Taylor filed a violation of
probation report stating that he: (1) failed to report to the
Ocala Probation Office; (2) absconded and changed his Ocala
address without approval; and (3) failed to comply with
electronic monitoring in Ocala. Plaintiff alleges that
Robinson and Taylor knew or should have known that no
violation report should have been filed and that they acted
“maliciously and in great disregard[ ]” for his
rights. Plaintiff alleges Robinson and Taylor violated his
fourth amendment rights by filing false violations that
resulted in his subsequent arrest without probable cause.
Plaintiff
alleges that state court Judge Martin Fitzpatrick acted
without jurisdiction and violated his fourteenth amendment
right to due process by issuing an arrest warrant without
probable cause. He alleges that his counsel, Stacey Sharpe,
and later, Thomas Gano violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel by failing to file certain motions and by entering
into agreements with the prosecutor. Plaintiff alleges that
assistant state attorney, Georgia Chappleman and Judge
Fitzpatrick violated his fourteenth amendment right to due
process by holding Plaintiff in Leon County to answer for
violations alleged in Marion County. Plaintiff was ultimately
convicted and sentenced to 21 months. Plaintiff alleges that
the City of Tallahassee violated his fourteenth amendment
right to due process based on the conduct of Judge
Fitzpatrick and assistant state attorney Chappleman.
While
Plaintiff's claims arise from more recent events not
addressed by prior lawsuits, his claims against these
Defendants are deficient for the same reasons explained in
previous cases. To sufficiently plead a § 1983
violation, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the conduct
complained of was conducted by someone acting under the color
of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived him of legally
recognized or Constitutional rights, privileges, or
immunities. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 561
(11th Cir.1984) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)).
As the
Court has repeatedly explained, some parties are immune from
§ 1983 claims based on their official role. See Wahl
v. McIver,773 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1985) (per
curiam) (discussing various types of immunity for those
involved in the public litigation process). Specifically,
Plaintiff's claims against Judge Martin Fitzpatrick are
barred by judicial immunity. See e.g., Rolle v.
Glenn, 4:17-cv-134-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla. March 31, 2017);
see also, Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1172 (“judges are
absolutely immune from civil liability ‘for their
judicial acts, even when such acts rare in excess of their
jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.'”). Likewise, his claim against
...