FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michelle
L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Christine Trakas
Thornhill, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cornelius C.
Demps, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Leon Thompson, Jr., appeals his sentences for false
imprisonment with a weapon and aggravated assault while
possessing a firearm. Specifically, he challenges the
imposition of certain special conditions of probation
relating to drug and alcohol treatment and evaluation. We
affirm. We write only to address Mr. Thompson's argument
that the trial court's failure to orally pronounce
certain special conditions requires that they be stricken.
written order of probation imposes special conditions
requiring that Mr. Thompson submit to certain drug and
alcohol evaluation and treatment, and the order also requires
that Mr. Thompson pay the costs of evaluation and treatment.
The trial court orally pronounced the evaluation and
treatment requirements but failed to orally pronounce the
requirement that Mr. Thompson pay the expenses associated
therewith. Mr. Thompson did not object to the evaluation and
treatment requirements at sentencing.
sentencing, Mr. Thompson filed a notice of appeal and, prior
to briefing, filed a timely motion to correct sentencing
error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)(2). In his motion, Mr. Thompson argued that the
record did not support the imposition of special conditions
(1) and (6) imposing drug and alcohol evaluation and
treatment requirements. He also argued that the requirements
that he pay any expenses associated with evaluation and
treatment were not orally pronounced and thus must be
stricken. The trial court filed no order ruling on the motion
and it is thus deemed denied pursuant to rule 3.800(b)(2)(B).
Mr. Thompson argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
failing to grant his 3.800(b) motion.
standard or general conditions of probation, which are
contained within the statutes, State v. Hart, 668
So.2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996) (citing Hart v. State,
651 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)), "[s]pecial terms
and conditions of probation must be imposed by oral
pronouncement at sentencing, " Lavender v.
State, 203 So.3d 969, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing
§ 948.039, Fla. Stat. (2014)). See §
948.039, Fla. Stat. (2015) ("The court shall impose the
special terms and conditions by oral pronouncement at
sentencing and include the terms and conditions in the
written sentencing order.").
to orally pronounce a special condition of probation once
required that the condition be stricken. Maddox v.
State, 760 So.2d 89, 105 (Fla. 2000); see Nank v.
State, 646 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (striking
special conditions requiring drug and alcohol evaluation and
treatment at defendant's own expense because the special
conditions were not orally pronounced); Cumbie v.
State, 597 So.2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (affirming
condition requiring testing because it was consistent with a
standard condition but striking "at your own
expense" language that was neither a standard condition
nor orally pronounced). The concern was that the unpronounced
special conditions of probation violated due process because
the defendant did not have notice and an opportunity to
object to the condition of probation. Maddox, 760
So.2d at 105.
the court noted in Maddox:
[F]ollowing [the supreme court's] promulgation of rule
3.800(b), defendants have been given a procedural mechanism
to object to the imposition of special conditions of
probation that have not been orally pronounced. This
procedural mechanism satisfies due process concerns because
the defendant has an opportunity to object following the
imposition of the special condition of probation.
Ladson v. State, 955 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007) (en banc), this court concluded that a defendant may be
afforded procedural due process through rule 3.800(b) even
where the trial court has failed to orally pronounce a
special condition. Through rule 3.800(b), "defendants
now have the opportunity to raise substantive objections to
probation conditions, and consequently, 'procedural due
process is satisfied without the need to orally pronounce
otherwise proper special probation conditions.' "
Lavender, 203 So.3d at 971 (quoting Ladson,
955 So.2d at 613); see also Grubb v. State, 922
So.2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 5th ...