United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
DANA BARNES, et al., Defendants. CASEY MATTINGLY, Plaintiff
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
was a pretrial detainee at the Duval County Jail when he
initiated this case.He is proceeding on a pro se Third Amended
Complaint (Doc. 22) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He claims that Defendants Dana Barnes,
M.D.; Linda Richo, N.P.; and Sohail Khan, P.A. violated his
constitutional rights when they were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs while he was housed at the
the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Khan (Doc. 70) and Defendants Barnes and Richo (Doc. 71).
Defendants filed Joint Exhibits (Doc. 72). The Court
previously advised Plaintiff of the provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and notified him that the
granting of a motion for summary judgment may foreclose
subsequent litigation on the matter. See Order (Doc.
24). Plaintiff filed a consolidated Response (Doc. 76) with
Exhibits and a Declaration (Doc. 77). Defendants Barnes and
Richo filed a Reply (Doc. 81), and Plaintiff filed a
Sur-Reply (Doc. 82). The Summary Judgment Motions are ripe for
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
9, 2013, Plaintiff slipped and fell in the Duval County Jail.
He suffered a “Lisfranc Injury.” He was seen by
physicians at UF Health,  who “recommended numerous
treatments to Dr. Dana Barnes on numerous occasions,
” such as “pain management, physical therapy,
reparative surgery, nerve blocks, and pain
medication.” However, Defendant “Barnes refused
to allow the Plaintiff to receive any of the treatments
until UF Health Physicians fought for them.”
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Barnes considered the
recommended treatments “elective” and
“stated that JSO [(Jacksonville Sheriff's Office)]
would not pay for them.” She also “refused to
administer narcotic pain medication from the onset of the
injury until the Plaintiff's leg was amputated and it
was no longer needed.” In April 2014, Defendant Khan
“took the Plaintiff's crutches from him and told
him to ‘crawl his ass back to his dorm.'”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Khan “threatened to
taze the Plaintiff if he didn't comply.” Defendant
“Khan refused to issue prescribe[d] medication from UF
Health and told other nurses to avoid talking with the
Plaintiff.” Defendant “Richo refused to issue
prescribed medication from UF Health, and has told the
Plaintiff that she would not refer him for speciality
consultation.” Plaintiff claims that he “was
suffering from Reflex Sympathy Dystrophy, a secondary and
serious condition emanating from the Defendants'
neglect and deliberate indifference of the Plaintiff's
Lisfranc Injury.” According to Plaintiff, the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent by “refusing
him medically necessary therapies[ and] narcotic medication,
” and “at points [were] hostile to the
Plaintiff.” He states that as a result of the
Defendants' actions and inactions, his left leg was
amputated “in order for him to gain some quality of
life and mobility.” Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
against each Defendant.
Parties' Summary Judgment Positions
Defendants argue that they were not deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiff's serious medical needs and they are
entitled to qualified immunity. They contend that Plaintiff
consistently received adequate medical care and treatment at
the jail, Florida State Hospital, and UF Health. Defendants
filed the following exhibits in support of their positions:
(1) the transcript of Plaintiff's deposition (Doc. 72-1
at 1-383) (Pl. Dep.) with exhibits (Doc. 72-1 at 384-482 to
Doc. 72-2 at 1-104); (2) large portions of Plaintiff's
medical records from the jail, UF Health, and Florida State
Hospital (Doc. 72-3 to Doc. 72-6); (3) declarations from
Defendant Barnes (Doc. 72-8 at 2-7) with exhibits (Doc. 72-8
at 9-38); Defendant Richo (Doc. 72-7 at 2-3) with exhibits
(Doc. 72-7 at 5-26); Defendant Khan with exhibits (Doc. 72-11
and Doc. 72-12); Tara Wildes, the former Director of
Corrections for the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (Doc.
72-10); Dr. Chaim Rogozinski, a board certified orthopedic
surgeon (Doc. 72-13); and Dr. Alan Abrams, a medical doctor
and psychiatrist (Doc. 72-14); (4) a deposition transcript of
Patricia Kalu, an RNP at Florida State Hospital (Doc. 72-9 at
2-14) with exhibits (Doc. 72-9 at 25-31); and (5) a
demonstrative calendar reflecting the day-by-day care
Plaintiff received from the date of his injury (May 9, 2013)
to after his amputation (March 2015) (Doc. 72-15). According
to Plaintiff, the record evidence shows that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
resulting in unnecessary pain and ultimately, a
below-the-knee amputation of his left leg.
Standard of Review
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'” Hinkle v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827 F.3d 1295, 1300
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jurich v. Compass Marine,
Inc., 764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014));
see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc.,
882 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation
If the movant satisfies the burden of production showing that
there is no genuine issue of fact, “the nonmoving party
must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Shiver v.
Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted). [The Court] draw[s] “all factual
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving
Winborn v. Supreme Beverage Co. Inc., 572 Fed.Appx.
672, 674 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (footnote and citation omitted).
“‘A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the
opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be
enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
that party.'” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Walker v.
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (internal
Deliberate Indifference Under 42 U.S.C. §
prevail on [a] § 1983 claim for inadequate medical
treatment, [the plaintiff] must show (1) a serious medical
need; (2) the health care providers' deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) causation between the
health care providers' indifference and [the
plaintiff's] injury.” Nam Dang by & through
Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272,
1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention. In the alternative, a serious
medical need is determined by whether a delay in treating the
need worsens the condition. In either case, the medical need
must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial
risk of serious harm.
Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307
(11th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted).
indifference to a serious medical need requires “three
components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more
than mere negligence.” Farrow v. West, 320
F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see
Dang, 871 F.3d at 1280; Melton, 841 F.3d at
1223 & n.2. “Subjective knowledge of the risk
requires that the defendant be ‘aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.'” Dang, 871 F.3d at 1280
(quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 784 F.3d
1090, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 2014)).
An official disregards a serious risk by more than mere
negligence “when he [or she] knows that an inmate is in
serious need of medical care, but he [or she] fails or
refuses to obtain medical treatment for the inmate.”
Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425
(11th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir.
2009). Even when medical care is ultimately provided, a
prison official may nonetheless act with deliberate
indifference by delaying the treatment of serious medical
needs. See Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388,
393-94 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Brown v. Hughes, 894
F.2d 1533, 1537-39 (11th Cir. 1990)). Further, “medical care
which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may
amount to deliberate indifference.” Mandel v.
Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted). However, medical treatment violates the
Constitution only when it is “so grossly incompetent,
inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Rogers v.
Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation
Dang, 871 F.3d at 1280. “‘[I]mputed or
collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of
deliberate indifference. Each individual defendant must be
judged separately and on the basis of what that person
kn[ew].'” Id. (quoting Burnette v.
Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008)).
party disputes that Plaintiff had a serious medical need. The
only question then is whether Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to that need. The Court considers Plaintiff's
claims as to each Defendant.
doing so, however, the Court addresses a consistent theme
throughout Plaintiff's deposition: his contention that
the medical records are inaccurate. Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence that these records were fabricated in
any way, and “[s]elf-serving statements by a plaintiff
do not create a question of fact in the face of
contradictory, contemporaneously created medical
records.” Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 Fed.Appx.
401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bennett v. Parker,
898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)); see generally Kingsland
v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004) (“[A] court need not entertain conclusory and
unsubstantiated allegations of fabrication of
evidence.” (citation omitted)). Regardless, these
“disputes” are not material for purposes of
resolving the Summary Judgment Motions.
alleges that Defendant Barnes “refused to administer
narcotic pain medication” and “refused to allow
the Plaintiff to receive any of the treatments until UF
Health Physicians fought for them, ” because Defendant
Barnes considered them “elective treatments” for
which “JSO would not pay.” During his deposition,
Plaintiff summarized his claims against Defendant Barnes.
My claim against Dr. Barnes is that she refused for the
physical therapy initially. She refused the nerve block
She refused the neurology consult, an ortho consult, I
believe a podiatry consult. There was four different times
that -- three or four different times. I think one of them
was a double entry. . . .
[T]he fact that she refused to give me medication that would
help actually combat my pain, actually reduce my pain and put
me in a state where, “Okay, I can function and live
with this as normally as possible, ” that's a claim
against her. Those are all of my claims against her.
Pl. Dep. (Doc. 72-1) at 328; see also id. at 329-30.
Barnes submitted the following Declaration.
My name is Dana Barnes. I am a defendant in the above-styled
action. I have been a Florida-licensed medical doctor since
2008 and Board-certified in family medicine since 2011. I am
the physician in charge of medical care and treatment at the
John E. Goode Pre-Trial Detention Facility, and have been in
this role since 2011.
I have personal knowledge of Casey Mattingly's injury to
his left foot, and the medical treatment that was provided to
him for his injury between 2013 and 2015.
I personally saw Mr. Mattingly in the PTDF medical clinic on
. . . .
My first encounter with Mr. Mattingly after his incarceration
at PTDF was on May 22, 2012. Mr. Mattingly was in self-harm
at the time recovering from a reported overdose and drug
withdrawal. Mr. Mattingly told me that he heavily abused MDMA
(commonly referred to as Ecstasy or Molly) and
benzodiazepines (commonly referred to as Xanax or Valium).
Mr. Mattingly also told me that he abused opiates that had
originally been prescribed to him for chronic pain.
After the injury to his left foot in May 2013, my medical
staff promptly sent him to the UF Health Emergency Department
for evaluation, and subsequently referred Mr. Mattingly to UF
Health Orthopedics and UF Health Podiatry.
Between May 2013 [and] his admission to UF Health for his
amputation in 2015, Mr. Mattingly was transported from the
PTDF to UF Health on dozens of occasions for X-rays, physical
therapy, and treatment and evaluation by orthopedics,
neurology, pain management, and podiatry.
On July 30, 2013, Mr. Mattingly was seen by UF Health
Podiatry and diagnosed with CRPS,  a diagnosis which was found
to be incorrect. The treating physician, a resident in
podiatry, recommended that Mr. Mattingly begin physical
therapy and also be evaluated by the UF Health Neurology
Department. I referred Mr. Mattingly to physical therapy, but
at that time, in my professional opinion, a neurology
consultation was not warranted given that the injury was so
recent and was expected to improve with physical therapy.
However, less than one month later, on August 20, 2013, I
decided to refer Mr. Mattingly to UF Health Neurology. Mr.
Mattingly was in fact seen by UF Health Neurology on
September 16, 2013.
On September 11, 2013, I examined Mr. Mattingly in the PTDF
medical clinic, and I referred him back to UF Health Podiatry
noting that repeat imaging should be considered given that
the injury was not getting any better.
On September 17, 2013, Mr. Mattingly was seen by podiatry and
I was advised by the podiatrist that a sympathetic nerve
block procedure was recommended. As this procedure involved
risks, including general anesthesia and spinal injections, I
called the podiatrist and explained that I believed this
procedure to be a last resort in CRPS cases and that I was
unaware of any benefit at this time. The podiatrist responded
that she would forward literature or evidence of the benefit
of this procedure to me, but she never sent me anything. In
my professional opinion, I believed that given the evasive
nature the potential harm substantially outweighed any
potential benefit. Further, any of the UF Health specialists,
including podiatry, could have admitted Mr. Mattingly at any
time and initiated this treatment as an in-patient procedure.
On September 18, 2013, after Mr. Mattingly was seen by UF
Health Neurology and Podiatry, I saw Mr. Mattingly in the
PTDF medical clinic. Previously, I had prescribed a drug
called Elavil for his pain. On this date, Mr. Mattingly told
me that the Elavil was not helping. I offered Mr. Mattingly
an increased dose of Elavil, but [he] refused and chose to
stop Elavil altogether. I advised Mr. Mattingly that he
needed to perform range of motion exercises all of the time,
not just at physical therapy, and that the non-usage of his
foot was the ...