Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Collins v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

April 3, 2018

EDWARD L. COLLINS, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.

          BRIAN J. DAVIS United States District Judge

         Petitioner initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1) on June 19, 2015.[1] He challenges his 2009 state court (Duval County, Florida) convictions for aggravated battery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of cocaine. Respondent Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections filed a motion to dismiss the Petition as untimely. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as Untimely (Response) (Doc. 13) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.).[2] Petitioner filed a reply. See Petitioner's “Adverse Reply” Motion to Respondents Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus as Untimely (Reply) (Doc. 15). This case is ripe for review.

         The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of - -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

         On December 9, 2009, a jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated battery (count one), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count two), and possession of cocaine (count three). Resp. Ex. A at 119-121. On December 17, 2009, the state court sentenced Petitioner to a twenty-year term of incarceration with a twenty-year minimum mandatory term of incarceration for count one, a fifteen-year term of incarceration for count two to run concurrent with count one, and a five-year term of incarceration for count three to run consecutive to count one. Id. at 175-81. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences without opinion on January 13, 2011, Resp. Ex. I, and issued its mandate on January 31, 2011. Resp. Ex. J. Petitioner's convictions became final on Wednesday, April 13, 2011, ninety days from January 13, 2011. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches when [the Supreme Court of the United States] affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.”); Supreme Court Rule 13 (“a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment”).[3] Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling, the one-year statute of limitations would begin to run on Thursday, April 14, 2011.

         Before his convictions became final, however, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure with the state court on March 18, 2011. Resp. Ex. K at 1-67. Then on November 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for post-conviction relief (the Court will refer to the motion for post-conviction relief and the supplemental motion for post-conviction relief collectively as the First 3.850 Motion). Id. at 68-76. On May 10, 2012, the state court denied the First 3.850 Motion. Id. at 77-114. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without opinion the denial of the First 3.850 Motion on February 1, 2013. Resp. Ex. N. Petitioner sought a rehearing, Resp. Ex. O, which was denied on April 3, 2013, Resp. Ex. P. The First DCA issued its mandate on April 19, 2013. Resp. Ex. Q.

         There is no dispute that the First 3.850 Motion was properly filed. “The one-year limitation[s] period for filing a § 2254 petition is tolled during times in which a ‘properly filed' application for state post-conviction relief is ‘pending.'” Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting 28. U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). “In Florida, a state post-conviction motion is pending until the appropriate appellate court issues the mandate for its order affirming a state trial court's denial of the motion.” Woulard v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 707 Fed.Appx. 631, 633 (11th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the properly filed First 3.850 Motion tolled the commencement of the one-year limitations period until April 19, 2013.

         Before the First DCA issued its mandate on the First 3.850 Motion, Petitioner filed a second motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 (Second 3.850 Motion) with the state court on March 14, 2013. Resp. Ex. R at 1-27. The state court dismissed the Second 3.850 Motion as procedurally barred and untimely on August 28, 2013. Id. at 28-39. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without opinion the dismissal of the Second 3.850 Motion on January 23, 2014, Resp. Ex. V, and issued its mandate on February 18, 2014. Resp. Ex. W. Because the Second 3.850 Motion was dismissed as untimely under state law, [4] it was not “properly filed, ” and thus, did not toll the statute of limitations. SeePace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)); Sykosky v. Crosby, 187 Fed.Appx. 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2006) (“. . . the state courts determined that [the petitioner's] motion was filed after a time limit and did not fit within any exceptions to that limit. We therefore defer to the determination of the state courts, and that ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.