final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Gary L.
Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Robinson challenges his convictions for sexual assault. After
careful consideration of the arguments and the record, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
fall of 2014, a University of West Florida sophomore invited
Robinson up to her dorm room. The young woman had met
Robinson the day before, and Robinson asked if he could visit
her while he was on campus. Inside her dorm room, the two
talked for a while before eventually kissing. The young woman
was okay with kissing, but Robinson did not stop there. He
soon became more aggressive, closed the door, and turned off
the lights. He picked up the young woman, put her on her bed,
and held her down. He grabbed her neck, pulled down her
pants, and forced himself on her.
was over, Robinson changed his shirt and left the dorm. The
young woman called her friends, who called the police. She
then went to the hospital, where a nurse examined her and
found internal tearing, blood, and a neck bruise in the shape
of a hand. Her underwear, soaked with blood, was collected
for DNA testing.
State charged Robinson with three counts of sexual battery
with force likely to cause serious personal injury, based on
three separate acts. Robinson testified at trial, admitting
to sex but claiming it was consensual. The young woman
testified too, and she said it was not consensual; she said
Robinson had raped her. The jury believed the young woman and
convicted Robinson on two of the three counts. Robinson was
sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years'
imprisonment. He now appeals, raising three issues.
first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by
excluding evidence of third-party DNA found in the young
woman's underwear. Although Florida's Rape Shield law
generally precludes this type of evidence to show consent,
§ 794.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2014), Robinson maintains the
evidence was relevant to show someone else caused her
injuries, see McGriff v. State, 601 So.2d 1320, 1321
(Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("Evidence of a victim's prior
sexual encounters with others is admissible . . . to show
that the defendant was not the source of the victim's
injury."). But this argument was never made below, even
after the State sought to exclude evidence of the young
woman's sexual history through a motion in limine-a
motion the court granted without objection. Therefore, this
argument was not preserved for our review. See Steinhorst
v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982).
next argues that the trial court erred by allowing a nurse to
offer certain expert testimony. The nurse had performed the
young woman's sexual-assault examination after the
incident, and counsel asked her whether the young woman's
injuries were "what you might see after forced sexual
intercourse or sexual battery." The nurse answered
affirmatively, Robinson objected that the nurse had not been
qualified as an expert, and after voir dire, the court
allowed the testimony. Robinson maintains the nurse was not
qualified to answer. We review only for an abuse of
discretion, see Penalver v. State, 926 So.2d 1118,
1134 (Fla. 2006), and we find none. On voir dire, the nurse
testified about her training and education, that she was
board certified as a sexual assault nurse examiner, and that
she performed more than thirty similar exams throughout her
training and practice. Given these facts, the court acted
within its discretion in allowing the testimony. And at any
rate, the nurse acknowledged on cross that the injuries were
also consistent with injuries she might expect to see from
consensual sex. Therefore, even if there were error in
admitting the testimony, we would find it harmless beyond
Robinson contends the trial court should have granted his
motion for judgment of acquittal, an issue we review de novo.
Huggins v. State, 135 So.3d 306, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA
2012). The State asked the jury to convict Robinson of sexual
battery with force likely to cause serious personal injury,
but the verdict form also included the lesser included
offense of sexual battery. The jury chose the greater
offense, but Robinson argues the State presented insufficient
evidence that he used force likely to cause "serious
personal injury, " a term defined to include "great
bodily harm or pain." § 794.011(1)(g), Fla. Stat.
(2014). In other words, Robinson contends the greatest
offense for which he could be convicted was sexual battery.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
State-as we must, Ibeagwa v. State, 141 So.3d 246,
246-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)-we conclude there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. The young woman
testified that Robinson held her down by her neck, bit her,
made her bleed, and caused her great pain. The young
woman's medical records, entered into evidence, detailed
a half-centimeter vaginal tear, significant bruising and
discoloration on her neck, and bleeding following the attack.
Other witnesses testified to seeing significant amounts of
blood on the young woman's bed sheets, and Robinson
himself testified that he changed shirts afterward because
the shirt he wore during the encounter was covered in blood.
This evidence-and all the inferences drawn from it-were
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that
Robinson used force sufficient to cause "great bodily
harm or pain."
Bilbrey and MK ...