final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. John T.
A. Miller, Public Defender, and Travis R. Gates, Assistant
Public Defender, Shalimar; Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and
Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee,
for Appellant; Jason Nicholas Frandi, pro se, Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
entered a negotiated plea to and was adjudicated guilty of 19
counts of possession of child pornography in violation of
section 827.071, Florida Statutes (2016). He was sentenced to
an aggregate term of 25 years in prison followed by a total
of 25 years of sex offender probation, and he was also
designated a sexual predator pursuant to section
775.21(4)(a)1.b. On appeal, after his appointed counsel filed
an Anders brief, Appellant filed a pro se brief
arguing that the trial court erred in designating him a
sexual predator because he had only been adjudicated
delinquent-and not convicted-of a prior sex offense.
affirm the sexual predator designation because Appellant
failed to preserve this issue for appeal. He did not present
the argument raised in his pro se brief to the trial court,
either at the sentencing hearing or in a rule 3.800(b)(2)
motion, and he cannot raise the issue for the first time on
appeal. See Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456
the issue had been preserved, it is meritless for two
the record shows that Appellant specifically agreed to the
sexual predator designation as part of the negotiated plea
agreement. Because this designation is not a sentence or a
punishment, Appellant was not precluded from agreeing to the
designation even if he did not qualify under the statute.
See Kingry v. State, 28 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010). And, because Appellant has received the benefits of
the plea agreement,  he cannot now seek to be relieved of one
of the burdens imposed on him by the agreement. Id.
in order to be designated a sexual predator pursuant to
section 775.21(4)(a)1.b., the defendant must be
"convicted" of a current offense that is a felony
violation of an enumerated statute (such as section 827.071),
and the defendant must also have previously "been
convicted of or found to have committed" a violation of
one of those enumerated statutes. Although an adjudication of
delinquency does not qualify as a conviction for purposes of
the current offense, see State v. J.M., 824 So.2d
105 (Fla. 2002), it does qualify for purposes of the prior
offense because section 775.21(4)(b) unequivocally states
that "[i]n order to be counted as a prior felony for
purposes of this subsection, the felony must have resulted in
a conviction sentenced separately, or an adjudication of
delinquency entered separately, prior to the current
offense . . ." (emphasis added). Here, Appellant was
convicted-not adjudicated delinquent-of a current offense
enumerated in section 775.21(4)(a)1.b., and although the
record does not reflect the specific prior offense for which
he was adjudicated delinquent,  Appellant has not argued-below or
on appeal-that the prior offense was not a violation of one
of the statutes enumerated in section 775.21(4)(a)1.b.
Accordingly, the trial court properly designated Appellant a
and Roberts, JJ., concur.