FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit
Court for Pinellas County; Michael F. Andrews, Judge.
Williams, pro se.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Linsey
Sims-Bohnenstiehl, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Williams appeals the postconviction court order dismissing as
successive his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm the dismissal of
Williams' claims with respect to his sentences in case
CRC84-01679-CFANO without comment. However, because the
record before this court does not demonstrate that
Williams' claim with respect to his sentences in case
CRC84-01993-CFANO is successive, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings on that claim only.
CRC84-01993-CFANO, a jury convicted Williams of burglary of a
dwelling or occupied structure and dealing in stolen
property, both second-degree felonies. See
§§ 810.02(3), 812.019(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984).
The statutory maximum for these charges is fifteen years'
imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat.
(Supp. 1984). The circuit court sentenced Williams as a
habitual felony offender, see § 775.084, to
thirty years' imprisonment for each count to be served
consecutively. This court vacated Williams' sentences on
appeal because the trial court provided improper reasons for
departing from the guidelines. See Williams v.
State, 493 So.2d 48, 48-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). On
remand, the trial court again sentenced Williams to
consecutive terms of thirty years' imprisonment and
provided written reasons for departure. However, the written
sentence does not provide that Williams was sentenced as a
habitual felony offender. This court affirmed Williams'
sentences on direct appeal. See Williams v. State,
509 So.2d 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (table decision).
summary record reveals that Williams filed at least one prior
rule 3.800(a) motion. In 2015, Williams filed a motion
alleging that his "HFO sentence exceeds the maximum
provided by law." In an October 19, 2015, order the
postconviction court denied this claim as to case
CRC84-01993-CFANO, reasoning that Williams' claims were
without merit because he was not designated as a HFO and that
his resentencing was affirmed on appeal. That order is silent
as to whether Williams' sentences are illegal for
exceeding the statutory maximum.
March 1, 2017, Williams filed a motion pursuant to rule
3.800(a), arguing, in pertinent part, that his thirty-year
sentences in case CRC84-01993-CFANO are illegal because they
exceed the statutory maximum sentence for second-degree
felonies, which is fifteen years' imprisonment.
See § 775.082(3)(c). The postconviction court
dismissed this claim as successive, referencing and attaching
the October 19, 2015, order.
review the denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion de novo.
Smith v. State, 143 So.3d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA
2014). Under rule 3.800(a), the burden is on the movant to
establish an entitlement to relief on the face of the record.
Smart v. State, 124 So.3d 347, 349 (Fla. 2d DCA
2013). Upon denying a facially sufficient motion, it is
incumbent upon the postconviction court to attach records
conclusively refuting the defendant's claim. England
v. State, 879 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
rule 3.800(a) allows for the filing of successive motions,
defendants are not entitled to litigate successive claims.
State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290-91 (Fla. 2003).
A postconviction court should not dismiss a claim as
successive unless it was the specific issue raised by the
prior motion and denied on the merits. See Fuston v.
State, 764 So.2d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). If a court
does dismiss a claim as successive, "a copy of that
portion of the files and records necessary to support the
court's ruling must accompany the order dismissing the
motion." Jones v. State, 198 So.3d 920, 921
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting rule 3.800(a)(2)); see also
Pleasure v. State, 931 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA
postconviction court erred in dismissing Williams' claim
that his sentences in CRC84-01993-CFANO are illegal for
exceeding the statutory maximum on the basis that this claim
was successive. The summary record does not demonstrate that
the postconviction court has previously ruled on the merits
of this particular claim. Although the postconviction court
reasoned that it denied a similar claim, the October 19,
2015, order does not demonstrate that this specific issue was
previously addressed on the merits. See Fuston, 764
So.2d at 780. The summary record before this court does not
otherwise conclusively refute Williams' claim that his
sentences are illegal for exceeding the statutory
we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. If the postconviction court again dismisses the
claim as successive, it must provide portions of the record
to support its dismissal. Alternatively, if the court
determines that ...