final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for
Miami-Dade County Lower Tribunal No. 17-21356, Dennis J.
Navarro Hernandez, P.L., and Luis F. Navarro, for appellant.
Offices of E. I. Friedman, P.A., and Eyal I. Friedman, for
EMAS, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ.
defendant below, Senia Rodriguez challenges a non-final order
that denied Rodriguez's Motion to Discharge Lis Pendens
or in the Alternative to Set Lis Pendens Bond
("Motion"). Finding no abuse of discretion, we
plaintiff below, Luis Villavicencio Guerra, recorded a notice
of lis pendens contemporaneously with Guerra's lawsuit
seeking to rescind a quitclaim deed, purporting to transfer
Guerra's property to Rodriguez. Rodriguez set her Motion as
a non-evidentiary hearing on the trial court's open
motion calendar. As is apparent from the transcript of the
hearing, the trial court concluded that Guerra's
claims were not "founded on a duly recorded
instrument" so as to authorize Guerra to record a lis
pendens as a matter of right. See § 48.23(3),
Fla. Stat. (2017); Am. Legion Cmty. Club v. Diamond,
561 So.2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1990) (concluding that an action to
set aside a conveyance of real property for fraud was not an
action "founded on the terms and provisions" of the
recorded instrument, "but on the circumstances
surrounding the execution" of the recorded instrument;
therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to a lis pendens as
a matter of right). Hence, as required by section 48.23(3),
the trial court adjudicated Rodriguez's motion as if
Guerra's notice of lis pendens was a temporary
injunction. § 48.23(3), Fla. Stat. (2017) ("When
the pending pleading does not show that the action is founded
on a duly recorded instrument . . . the court shall control
and discharge the recorded notice of lis pendens as the court
would grant and dissolve injunctions."); Med.
Facilities Dev., Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Props., Inc.,
675 So.2d 915, 917 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that, where an
action is not based on a duly recorded instrument, the
proponent is entitled to maintain a lis pendens where the
proponent shows a "fair nexus between the property and
not entirely clear from the hearing transcript, it does
appear that the trial court determined that Guerra had met
his burden of establishing a fair nexus between the subject
property and the underlying action. Upon finding that
Rodriguez had not satisfied her burden of demonstrating
irreparable harm, the trial court then exercised its
discretion not to impose a requirement of a bond. Med.
Facilities Dev., Inc., 675 So.2d at 917-18 ("[T]he
decision of whether a lis-pendens bond should be posted rests
within the discretion of the trial judge. . . . Our holding
today specifically rejects the interpretation that the
statutory reference to injunctions requires the lis-pendens
proponent to post a bond in every case."). While a
better practice may have been for the trial court to schedule
an evidentiary hearing on the bond issue, we can hardly
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in this
regard when Rodriguez scheduled the hearing on her Motion as
a non-evidentiary hearing on the trial court's open motion
 While appellant challenged the subject
non-final order via appeal, we recognize that recent
decisions of this Court indicate that the appropriate
procedure for reviewing non-final orders granting or
discharging a lis pendens, and non-final orders relating to
lis pendens bonds, is via a certiorari petition. See
Bankers Lending Servs., Inc. v. Regents Park Invs., LLC,
225 So.3d 884, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); 100 Lincoln Rd.
SB, LLC v. Daxan 26 (FL), LLC, 180 So.3d 134, 136 (Fla.
3d DCA 2015). These recent decisions, though, did not
abrogate prior decisions of this Court concluding that we
have appellate jurisdiction to review such non-final orders
under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B).
See Acapulco Constr., Inc. v. Redavo Estates, Inc.,
645 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Roger Homes Corp.
v. Persant Constr. Co., 637 So.2d 5, 6 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994); Munilla v. Espinosa, 533 So.2d 895, 895 n.1
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The result in this case is not dependent
upon the review mechanism, and would have been the same had
appellant filed a petition for certiorari relief rather than
 After Guerra executed a power of
attorney purportedly authorizing Rodriguez to execute
documents on Guerra's behalf, Rodriguez, allegedly acting
pursuant to the power of attorney, ...