final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Ernest A. Kollra, Judge; L.T. Case Nos.
09-11214CF10A, 09-20410CF10A and 11-2594CF10A.
Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina
Jimenez-Orosa, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Coppinger was charged with violating his probation contrary
to the terms of a substantial assistance agreement with the
State. The trial court adjudicated him guilty of the
violation, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms on
the charges in three separate cases that was the basis of his
probation. He raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation
and impose a sentence on the third degree felony charge
carrying a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Second,
he alleges that the trial court considered impermissible
factors during resentencing. We decline to address the second
issue, finding it without merit. However, we agree with
Coppinger as to the first issue, and reverse his conviction
as to the third degree felony.
April 2010, Coppinger pled no contest in one case to dealing
in stolen property, a second degree felony punishable by a
term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years; and grand
theft of over $300, a third degree felony punishable by a
term of imprisonment not exceeding five years. He also pled
no contest in a second case to dealing in stolen property.
The court withheld adjudication on all charges, and imposed
concurrent three-year probationary terms on each count.
March 2011, Coppinger pled no contest to committing new
criminal offenses,  and admitted violating his probation on
the 2010 cases. At sentencing, the court withheld
adjudication, but amended his probation to concurrent
four-year probationary terms on the charges stemming from the
two cases from 2010 and the charges arising from the new
case. However, the trial court did not award Coppinger any
credit for his prior probationary service for the 2010 cases.
2011, Coppinger's probation was reinstated after he
admitted to violating his probation again by failing to
undergo a drug/alcohol evaluation and submit to biweekly
months later, Coppinger once more pled no contest to
committing new criminal offenses,  and admitted to violating
his probation. This time, the trial court not only reinstated
the probation, but also modified it to include an additional
six months of community control followed by four years of
probation. Again, the trial court did not award Coppinger any
credit for his prior probationary service.
September 2015, after Coppinger committed two technical
violations of his probation,  he entered into a substantial
assistance agreement with the State. The agreement explicitly
set out the maximum penalties for each of his probationary
charges. Coppinger agreed that the commission of any new
criminal offense during the pendency of the agreement,
including any traffic criminal offense, would be a violation
of the agreement. He also acknowledged that if he violated
any of the terms of the agreement, he would subject himself
to the maximum penalties described. After entering an open
plea to the new VOP charge, the trial court deferred
sentencing for thirty days, and released him on his own
recognizance so he could render the agreed-upon assistance.
weeks later, Coppinger was arrested again, this time
following a traffic stop for driving while his license was
suspended. Having apparently exhausted the trial court's
patience, the judge revoked Coppinger's release, and
ordered him held without bond, thus "tolling"
Coppinger's probation until sentencing. Following a
hearing on his VOP, Coppinger was adjudicated guilty on the
three 2010 charges and sentenced to concurrent maximum
sentences of fifteen years for the two second degree
felonies, and five years for the third degree felony.
argues that if the judge had properly given him credit for
the time he had previously served on probation, then the
trial court would have lacked jurisdiction to both adjudicate
and sentence him on the third degree felony charge from 2010.
a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
reviewed de novo." Mobley v. State, 197 So.3d
572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Sanchez v.